opennebula-common-7.2.0-alt1.noarch	sisyphus_check	fail	sisyphus_check failed:  /ALT/Sisyphus/files/noarch/RPMS/opennebula-common-7.2.0-alt1.noarch.rpm: Invalid path names: /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/opennebula-common.conf /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/opennebula-node.conf sisyphus_check: check-fhs ERROR: FHS violation; 
opennebula-fireedge-7.2.0-alt1.x86_64	systemd-but-no-native-init	experimental	The package have native systemd file(s) but no  SysV init scripts.
opennebula-flow-7.2.0-alt1.noarch	systemd-but-no-native-init	experimental	The package have native systemd file(s) but no  SysV init scripts.
opennebula-form-7.2.0-alt1.noarch	systemd-but-no-native-init	experimental	The package have native systemd file(s) but no  SysV init scripts.
opennebula-gate-7.2.0-alt1.noarch	systemd-but-no-native-init	experimental	The package have native systemd file(s) but no  SysV init scripts.
opennebula-server-7.2.0-alt1.x86_64	arch-dep-package-has-big-usr-share	info	The package has a significant amount of architecture-independent data in /usr/share, while it is an architecture-dependent package. This is wasteful of mirror space and bandwidth, as we then end up with multiple copies of this data, one for each architecture. If the data in /usr/share is not architecture-independent, it is a policy violation, and in this case, you should move that data elsewhere.; 
opennebula-server-7.2.0-alt1.x86_64	systemd-but-no-native-init	experimental	The package have native systemd file(s) but no  SysV init scripts.
opennebula-server-7.2.0-alt1.x86_64	unsafe-tmp-usage-in-scripts	fail	The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /var/lib/one/remotes/im/qemu.d/monitord-client_control.sh: $ grep /tmp/ /var/lib/one/remotes/im/qemu.d/monitord-client_control.sh # Collectd client (Ruby) CLIENT=$DIR/${BASENAME}.rb # Collectd client PID CLIENT_PID_FILE=/tmp/one-monitord-$HID.pid # Launch the client function start_client() { rm $CLIENT_PID_FILE >/dev/null 2>&1 echo "$STDIN" | /usr/bin/env ruby $CLIENT $ARGV 2> /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error & CLIENT_PID=$! sleep 1 if [ "$CLIENT_PID" ] || ! ps $CLIENT_PID > /dev/null; then cat /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error exit 1 fi echo $CLIENT_PID > $CLIENT_PID_FILE } Found error in /var/lib/one/remotes/im/lxc.d/monitord-client_control.sh: $ grep /tmp/ /var/lib/one/remotes/im/lxc.d/monitord-client_control.sh # Collectd client (Ruby) CLIENT=$DIR/${BASENAME}.rb # Collectd client PID CLIENT_PID_FILE=/tmp/one-monitord-$HID.pid # Launch the client function start_client() { rm $CLIENT_PID_FILE >/dev/null 2>&1 echo "$STDIN" | /usr/bin/env ruby $CLIENT $ARGV 2> /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error & CLIENT_PID=$! sleep 1 if [ "$CLIENT_PID" ] || ! ps $CLIENT_PID > /dev/null; then cat /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error exit 1 fi echo $CLIENT_PID > $CLIENT_PID_FILE } Found error in /var/lib/one/remotes/im/kvm.d/monitord-client_control.sh: $ grep /tmp/ /var/lib/one/remotes/im/kvm.d/monitord-client_control.sh # Collectd client (Ruby) CLIENT=$DIR/${BASENAME}.rb # Collectd client PID CLIENT_PID_FILE=/tmp/one-monitord-$HID.pid # Launch the client function start_client() { rm $CLIENT_PID_FILE >/dev/null 2>&1 echo "$STDIN" | /usr/bin/env ruby $CLIENT $ARGV 2> /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error & CLIENT_PID=$! sleep 1 if [ "$CLIENT_PID" ] || ! ps $CLIENT_PID > /dev/null; then cat /tmp/one-monitord-$HID.error exit 1 fi echo $CLIENT_PID > $CLIENT_PID_FILE }; 
