Repocop reports by test

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fail CanFestival-3-source-2015.08.03-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/src/CanFestival-3/configure: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/src/CanFestival-3/configure ########################################################################### if [ "$SUB_WX" = "" ]; then if which wx-config >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo -n "Testing wxWidgets compiles ... " cat > /tmp/wx_test.cpp </dev/null 2>&1 ; then SUB_WX=1 echo "Yes" else SUB_WX=0 echo "No" fi rm -f /tmp/wx_test* else SUB_WX=0 echo "No wxWidgets available" fi fi
fail GMT-6.0.0-alt1_3.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/gmt_shell_functions.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/gmt_shell_functions.sh cat <<- EOF > doc.kml EOF ls kml/*.kml > /tmp/$$.lis while read file; do name=`basename $file .kml` cat << EOF >> doc.kml $name $file EOF done < /tmp/$$.lis cat << EOF >> doc.kml EOF zip -rq9 $name.kmz doc.kml kml if [ $remove -eq 0 ]; then mv -f kml/* .. fi rm -rf kml doc.kml /tmp/$$.lis } # For animations: Build animated gif from stills gmt_build_gif() { if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then -- usage: gmt_launch_jobs [-c ] [-l ] [-n] [-v] [-w] is a file with a list of all the commands -c Specify how many separate cores to use [$n_cpu] -l Specify how many lines constitute one job cluster [1] -n Dry-run. Do not launch jobs but leave core scripts as /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs.##.sh -r Remove core scripts when the jobs complete -v Verbose. Give progress messages -w Wait for completion of all core jobs before exiting EOF return -- *) echo "gmt_launch_jobs: No such option ($1)" >&2 ;; esac shift done egrep -v '^#|^$' $1 > /tmp/$$.sh nL=`wc -l /tmp/$$.sh | awk '{printf "%d\n", $1}'` n_chunks=`gmt math -Q $nL $n_lines DIV =` bad=`gmt math -Q $n_chunks DUP RINT SUB ABS 1e-10 GT =` if [ $bad -eq 1 ]; then echo "gmt_launch_jobs: Your number of commands is not a multiple of $n_lines" >&2 exit 1 -- tag="."$$ fi # Create n_cpu empty files for execution let cpu=0 while [ $cpu -lt $n_cpu ]; do printf "#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# gmt_launch_jobs command file chunk # ${cpu}\n#---------------------------------\n" > /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh let cpu=cpu+1 done # Distribute $n_lines from the commands across these core scripts let chunk=0; let cpu=0; let sub=n_lines-1; let last=0 while [ $chunk -lt $n_chunks ]; do let last=last+n_lines let first=last-sub sed -n ${first},${last}p /tmp/$$.sh >> /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh let cpu=cpu+1 if [ $cpu -eq $n_cpu ]; then let cpu=0 fi let chunk=chunk+1 done # Launch the $n_cpu scripts let cpu=0 while [ $cpu -lt $n_cpu ]; do if [ $blabber -eq 1 ]; then echo "gmt_launch_jobs: Starting /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh" >&2 fi if [ $do_remove -eq 1 ]; then echo "rm -f /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh" >> /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh fi if [ $dryrun -eq 0 ]; then bash /tmp/gmt_launch_jobs${tag}.$cpu.sh & fi let cpu=cpu+1 done rm -f /tmp/$$.sh if [ $do_wait -eq 1 ] && [ $dryrun -eq 0 ]; then wait # Wait until all jobs launched by this script have completed if [ $blabber -eq 1 ]; then echo "gmt_launch_jobs: All $n_cpu jobs completed" >&2 fi
fail GMT-common-6.0.0-alt1_3.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/gmt/tools/gmt_prepmex.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/gmt/tools/gmt_prepmex.sh # First get a reliable absolute path to the bundle's top directory pushd `dirname $0` > /dev/null BUNDLEDIR=`pwd | sed -e sB/Contents/Resources/share/toolsBBg` popd > /dev/null # Set path to the new gmt installation MEXGMT5DIR=/tmp/$$/gmt # Set path to additional subdirectories MEXLIBDIR=$MEXGMT5DIR/lib MEXINCDIR=$MEXGMT5DIR/include MEXSHADIR=$MEXGMT5DIR/share MEXBINDIR=$MEXGMT5DIR/bin -- cp -r etc usr $MEXBINDIR # Now copy the lib files printf "gmt_prepmex.sh: Copy and rename libraries\n" >&2 cd $BUNDLEDIR/Contents/Resources/lib # Find a list of all libs shipped with the OSX bundle, except our own: ls *.dylib | egrep -v 'libgmt.dylib|libpostscriptlight.dylib' > /tmp/l.lis # For each, duplicate into /opt/gmt but add a leading X to each name while read lib; do new=`echo $lib | awk '{printf "libX%s\n", substr($1,4)}'` cp $lib $MEXLIBDIR/$new done < /tmp/l.lis # Copy the supplement shared plugin cp gmt/plugins/supplements.so $MEXLIBDIR/gmt/plugins cd $MEXLIBDIR ls *.dylib > /tmp/l.lis printf "gmt_prepmex.sh: Rebaptize libraries\n" >&2 # For all libs in $MEXLIBDIR, change internal references to contain the leading "X" while read lib; do otool -L $lib | grep executable_path | awk '{print $1}' > /tmp/t.lis let k=1 while read old; do new=`echo $old | awk -F/ '{printf "libX%s\n", substr($NF,4)}'` if [ $k -eq 1 ]; then # Do the id change was=`echo $lib | awk -F/ '{print substr($1,4)}'` install_name_tool -id /opt/gmt/lib/$new $lib else install_name_tool -change $old /opt/gmt/lib/$new $lib fi let k=k+1 done < /tmp/t.lis done < /tmp/l.lis # Set links to the new libs ln -s libXgmt.dylib libgmt.dylib ln -s libXpostscriptlight.dylib libpostscriptlight.dylib ln -s libXgmt.6.dylib libXgmt.dylib ln -s libXpostscriptlight.6.dylib libXpostscriptlight.dylib -- fi fi # Do plugin supplement separately since not called lib* cd gmt/plugins otool -L supplements.so | grep executable_path | awk '{print $1}' > /tmp/t.lis let k=1 while read old; do new=`echo $old | awk -F/ '{printf "libX%s\n", substr($NF,4)}'` install_name_tool -change $old /opt/gmt/lib/$new supplements.so let k=k+1 done < /tmp/t.lis # Do bin dir cd $MEXBINDIR otool -L gmt | grep executable_path | awk '{print $1}' > /tmp/t.lis let k=1 while read old; do new=`echo $old | awk -F/ '{printf "libX%s\n", substr($NF,4)}'` install_name_tool -change $old /opt/gmt/lib/$new gmt let k=k+1 done < /tmp/t.lis chmod -R ugo+r $MEXGMT5DIR printf "gmt_prepmex.sh: Install /opt/gmt\n" >&2 sudo cp -fpR $MEXGMT5DIR /opt rm -rf /tmp/$$ cd $here version=`/opt/gmt/bin/gmt-config --version` # Report cat << EOF >&2 gmt_prepmex.sh: Made updated GMT $version installation in /opt/gmt Found error in /usr/share/gmt/tools/gmt_make_custom_code.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/gmt/tools/gmt_make_custom_code.sh # Make sure we get both upper- and lower-case versions of the tag U_TAG=`echo $LIB | tr '[a-z]' '[A-Z]'` L_TAG=`echo $LIB | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'` # Look in current dir grep "#define THIS_MODULE_LIB" *.c | awk -F: '{print $1}' | sort > /tmp/tmp.lis rm -f /tmp/NAME.lis /tmp/LIB.lis /tmp/PURPOSE.lis /tmp/KEYS.lis /tmp/all.lis while read program; do grep "#define THIS_MODULE_CLASSIC_NAME" $program | awk '{print $3}' | sed -e 's/"//g' >> /tmp/NAME.lis grep "#define THIS_MODULE_LIB" $program | awk '{print $3}' | sed -e 's/"//g' >> /tmp/LIB.lis grep "#define THIS_MODULE_PURPOSE" $program | sed -e 's/#define THIS_MODULE_PURPOSE//g' | awk '{print $0}' >> /tmp/PURPOSE.lis grep "#define THIS_MODULE_KEYS" $program | sed -e 's/#define THIS_MODULE_KEYS//g' | awk '{print $0}' >> /tmp/KEYS.lis done < /tmp/tmp.lis # Prepend group+name so we can get a list sorted on group name then individual programs paste /tmp/LIB.lis /tmp/NAME.lis | awk '{printf "%s%s|%s\n", $1, $2, $2}' > /tmp/SORT.txt paste /tmp/SORT.txt /tmp/LIB.lis /tmp/PURPOSE.lis /tmp/KEYS.lis | sort -k1 > /tmp/SORTED.txt awk -F"|" '{print $2}' /tmp/SORTED.txt > /tmp/$LIB.txt rm -f /tmp/tmp.lis /tmp/NAME.lis /tmp/LIB.lis /tmp/PURPOSE.lis /tmp/KEYS.lis /tmp/SORTED.txt /tmp/SORT.txt # Extract the extension purpose string from CMakeLists.txt if [ -f CMakeLists.txt ]; then LIB_STRING=`grep LIB_STRING CMakeLists.txt | awk -F= '{print $NF}'` else -- /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Declaration modifiers for DLL support (MSC et al) etc/ usr/ #include "declspec.h" /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Prototypes of all modules in the GMT ${L_TAG} library etc/ usr/ EOF gawk '{printf "EXTERN_MSC int GMT_%s (void *API, int mode, void *args);\n", $1;}' /tmp/$LIB.txt >> ${FILE_CUSTOM_MODULE_H} cat << EOF >> ${FILE_CUSTOM_MODULE_H} /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Pretty print all modules in the GMT ${L_TAG} library and their purposes etc/ usr/ EXTERN_MSC void gmt_${L_TAG}_module_show_all (void *API); /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var List all modules in the GMT ${L_TAG} library to stdout etc/ usr/ -- gawk ' BEGIN { FS = "\t"; } { printf "\t{\"%s\", \"%s\", %s, %s},\n", $1, $2, $3, $4; }' /tmp/$LIB.txt >> ${FILE_CUSTOM_MODULE_C} cat << EOF >> ${FILE_CUSTOM_MODULE_C} {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var last element == NULL detects end of array etc/ usr/ }; EOF
fail alterator-mass-management-0.1.7-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/mass-management: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/mass-management mkdir -p "$TASKS_DIR/task-$number" cat >"$TASKS_DIR/task-$number.yml" <> /tmp/mode.log echo "$(set|grep -a "in_")" >> /tmp/mode.log case "$in_action" in type) write_type_item hostlist hostname-list #write_type_item add_host hostname ;;
fail alterator-net-domain-0.7.0-alt8.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/net-domain: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/net-domain ## https://www.altlinux.org/ActiveDirectory/DC ad_provision_domain() { local domain_name="$1" shift local log="/tmp/samba-dc-provision-$(date +%d.%m.%Y-%H:%M:%S)-$domain_name.log" # Begin log date > "$log" echo "Domain: $domain_name" >> "$log" echo >> "$log" -- if [ "$in_domain_type" = 'ad' ]; then if ipa_install_running; then ipa_install_stop fi env > /tmp/net-domain.txt ad_current_domain="$($samba_tool domain info '127.0.0.1' | sed 's/ *: /:/' | sed -n 's/^Domain://p')" # Check creation of existing domain if [ "$ad_current_domain" != "$in_domain" ]; then write_domain "$in_domain" "1"
fail alterator-netinst-1.9.1-alt3.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/netinst: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/netinst elif [ -n "$in_add" ]; then [ "$in_get_from" = "url" ] && run_localized alterator-netinst -A "$in_add_url" || run_localized alterator-netinst -A "cdrom:" else set >> /tmp/log if [ -n "$in_vnc" ]; then if [ "$in_vnc" = '#t' ] ; then vnc= headless= [ "$in_headless" = '#t' ] && headless='headless'
fail alterator-pkg-2.7.3-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/pkg-install: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/pkg-install ;; write) case "$in__objects" in /) if test_bool "$in_auto"; then make_apt < /dev/null &> /tmp/pkg-install.log else start_pipe &> /tmp/pkg-install.log fi ;; notify) write_pipe "$in_message" ;; Found error in /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/pkg-size: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/alterator/backend3/pkg-size echo "pkg-size:start" local tmpfile="$(make_manifest $in_lists)" if [ -s "$tmpfile" ]; then stderr_handler & echo "n"|apt-get --simple-output install --manifest "$tmpfile" 2>> /tmp/install2.log || rc=$? else echo "apt-get:status:disk-size:0k" fi rm -f "$tmpfile" echo "pkg-size:finish:$rc"
fail asterisk-16.4.1-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/asterisk/scripts/ast_loggrabber: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/asterisk/scripts/ast_loggrabber # Timestamp to use for output files df=${tarball_uniqueid:-$(${DATEFORMAT})} # Extract the Python timestamp conver script from the end of this # script and save it to /tmp/.ast_tsconvert.py ss=`egrep -n "^#@@@SCRIPTSTART@@@" $0 |cut -f1 -d:` tail -n +${ss} $0 >/tmp/.ast_tsconvert.py tmpdir=$(mktemp -d) if [ -z "$tmpdir" ] ; then echo "${prog}: Unable to create temporary directory." exit 1 -- destdir="$tmpdir/$tardir/$(dirname $lf)" destfile="$tmpdir/$tardir/$lf" mkdir -p "$destdir" 2>/dev/null || : if [ -n "$LOG_DATEFORMAT" ] ; then echo "Converting $lf" cat "$lf" | python /tmp/.ast_tsconvert.py --format="$LOG_DATEFORMAT" --timezone="$LOG_TIMEZONE" > "${destfile}" else echo "Copying $lf" cp "$lf" "${destfile}" fi done echo "Creating /tmp/$tardir.tar.gz" tar -czvf /tmp/$tardir.tar.gz -C $tmpdir $tardir 2>/dev/null exit # Be careful editng the inline scripts. # They're space-indented.
fail bacula9-director-common-9.6.3-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/bacula9-director-common-9.6.3/updatedb/update_mysql_tables_11_to_12: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/bacula9-director-common-9.6.3/updatedb/update_mysql_tables_11_to_12 echo " " bindir=/usr/bin PATH="$bindir:$PATH" db_name=${db_name:-bacula} mysql $* -D ${db_name} -e "select VersionId from Version\G" >/tmp/$$ DBVERSION=`sed -n -e 's/^VersionId: \(.*\)$/\1/p' /tmp/$$` if [ $DBVERSION != 11 ] ; then echo " " echo "The existing database is version $DBVERSION !!" echo "This script can only update an existing version 11 database to version 12." echo "Error. Cannot upgrade this database."
fail bacula9-director-mysql-9.6.3-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/bacula/scripts/update_mysql_tables: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/bacula/scripts/update_mysql_tables ARGS=$* getVersion() { mysql $ARGS -D ${db_name} -e "select VersionId from Version LIMIT 1\G" >/tmp/$$ DBVERSION=`sed -n -e 's/^VersionId: \(.*\)$/\1/p' /tmp/$$` } getVersion if [ "x$DBVERSION" = x ]; then
fail environment-modules-4.4.1-alt1_2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/Modules/bin/add.modules: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/Modules/bin/add.modules $3 > $2 } # find if certain of the dot files have load lines already findload() { grep "^[ ]*module[ ]*load" $1 > /tmp/load.$$ } # put common stuff derivatives here $1=.dot_file $2=action $3=shell(csh,sh) $4=skel alternative shdot() { if [ -f $1 ] then /bin/cat <> $1 else /bin/cat >> $1 < $1 <> $1 else /bin/cat >> $1 <> $1 <> $1 && /bin/rm /tmp/$1.$$ elif [ x$2 = xalias ] then /bin/cat <> $1 && /bin/rm /tmp/$1.$$ fi else /bin/echo "Had problems with your $1" fi else /bin/cat < /dev/null } # process files in $HOME cd $HOME if [ -r .bash_profile ]; then
fail foo2zjs-20200207-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/foo2ddst-wrapper: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/foo2ddst-wrapper #%%BeginFeature: *CustomPageSize True #792.000000 612.000000 1 0.000000 0.000000 #pop pop pop pop pop if [ $DEBUG = 0 ]; then TMPFILE=/tmp/cus$$ else TMPFILE=/tmp/custom.ps fi cat >$TMPFILE exec <$TMPFILE tmp=`head -n 10000 $TMPFILE \ -- case $NUP in [234689]|1[024568]) PREFILTER="nup";; *) PREFILTER=cat;; esac if [ "$DEBUG" -ge 9 ]; then PREFILTER="tee /tmp/$BASENAME.ps" fi # # Overload -G. If the file name ends with ".icm" or ".ICM" # then convert the ICC color profile to a Postscript CRD, -- GAMMAFILE= fi } if [ $DEBUG -gt 0 ]; then ICCTMP=/tmp/icc else ICCTMP=/tmp/icc$$ fi if [ "" = "$COLOR" ]; then COLORMODE= GAMMAFILE= Found error in /usr/bin/foo2hbpl2-wrapper: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/foo2hbpl2-wrapper #%%BeginFeature: *CustomPageSize True #792.000000 612.000000 1 0.000000 0.000000 #pop pop pop pop pop if [ $DEBUG = 0 ]; then TMPFILE=/tmp/cus$$ else TMPFILE=/tmp/custom.ps fi cat >$TMPFILE exec <$TMPFILE tmp=`head -n 10000 $TMPFILE \ -- case $NUP in [234689]|1[024568]) PREFILTER="nup";; *) PREFILTER=cat;; esac if [ "$DEBUG" -ge 9 ]; then PREFILTER="tee /tmp/$BASENAME.ps" fi # # Overload -G. If the file name ends with ".icm" or ".ICM" # then convert the ICC color profile to a Postscript CRD, -- GAMMAFILE= fi } if [ $DEBUG -gt 0 ]; then ICCTMP=/tmp/icc else ICCTMP=/tmp/icc$$ fi if [ "" = "$COLOR" ]; then COLORMODE= GAMMAFILE= -- # CRD GAMMAFILE="" GAMMAFILE="$GAMMAFILE $CRDBASE/${model}cms" GAMMAFILE="$GAMMAFILE $CRDBASE/$SCREEN" # Black text... TMPFILE2=/tmp/black$$ cat $CRDBASE/black-text.ps - >$TMPFILE2 exec <$TMPFILE2 ;; *.crd) GAMMAFILE="$CRDBASE/prolog.ps"
fail geeqie-1.5.1-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib64/geeqie/geeqie-camera-import: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib64/geeqie/geeqie-camera-import # Import all images from camera # Requires gphoto2 function finish { if [ -f /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files ] then rm /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files fi if [ -p $zen_pipe ] then rm $zen_pipe -- then zenity --title="Geeqie camera import" --info --width=200 --text="gphoto2 is not installed" 2>/dev/null exit 0 fi if [ -f /tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log ] then rm /tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log fi if [ $(gphoto2 --auto-detect | wc -l) -le 2 ] then zenity --error --title="Geeqie camera import" --text="No camera detected" --window-icon=/usr/local/share/pixmaps/geeqie.png --width=250 2>/dev/null -- src_files_sorted=$(mktemp --tmpdir geeqie_camera_import_camera_files_sorted_XXXXXX) dest_files_sorted=$(mktemp --tmpdir geeqie_camera_import_computer_files_sorted_XXXXXX) ( gphoto2 --port "$port" --list-files 2>/tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log | awk '/#/ {print $2}' | sort > $src_files_sorted ) | zenity --progress --auto-close --auto-kill --title="Geeqie camera import" --text="Searching for files to download..." --pulsate --window-icon=/usr/local/share/pixmaps/geeqie.png --width=250 error=$(grep -i error /tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log) if [ ! -z "$error" ] then cat /tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log | zenity --text-info --title="Geeqie camera import" - --window-icon=error --width=250 2>/dev/null exit 1 fi ls -1 | sort > $dest_files_sorted existing_file_count=$(comm -12 $src_files_sorted $dest_files_sorted | wc -l) -- then zenity --info --title="Geeqie camera download" --text="No photos to download" --width=250 --window-icon=usr/local/share/pixmaps/geeqie.png 2>/dev/null exit 0 fi if [ -f /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files ] then rm /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files fi touch /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files zen_pipe=$(mktemp --dry-run --tmpdir geeqie_camera_import_pipe_XXXXXX) mkfifo $zen_pipe gphoto2 --port "$port" --hook-script "$script_dir/"geeqie-camera-import-hook-script --get-all-files --skip-existing 2>/tmp/geeqie-camera-import.log & gphoto2_pid=$! (tail -f $zen_pipe 2>/dev/null) | zenity --progress --title="Geeqie camera import" --width=370 --text="Downloading: total: $files_to_load existing: $existing_file_count\n" --auto-close --auto-kill --percentage=0 window-icon=/usr/local/share/pixmaps/geeqie.png 2>/dev/null & zen_pid=$! n=0 while [ -f /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files ] && [ "$n" -lt 100 ] do i=$(cat "/tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files" | wc -l) n=$(( $((i usr 100)) / $files_to_load)) echo "$n" >$zen_pipe latest_file=$(tail -n 1 /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files) if [ -z "$latest_file" ] then latest_file="Skipping existing files, if any..." fi echo "#Downloading: total: $files_to_load existing: $existing_file_count\n$latest_file" >$zen_pipe Found error in /usr/lib64/geeqie/geeqie-camera-import-hook-script: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib64/geeqie/geeqie-camera-import-hook-script # Camera import if [ "$ACTION" == "download" ] then echo "$ARGUMENT" >> /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files elif [ "$ACTION" == "stop" ] then zenity --info --title="Geeqie camera download" --text="Import ended" --width=200 --timeout=5 --window-icon=usr/local/share/pixmaps/geeqie.png 2>/dev/null if [ -f /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files ] then rm /tmp/geeqie-camera-import-files fi fi exit 0
fail gnormalize-0.63-alt1.qa1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/gnormalize: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/gnormalize if ($show_cdplayer_skin and defined $window_cd_player){ # with skin_xTunes $widget->set_size_request (225, 90); # set a minimum size: (width,height) ; skin_xTunes #(pixmap, mask) = Gtk2::Gdk::Pixmap->create_from_xpm ($drawable, $transparent_color, $filename) #($pixmap, $pixmap_mask) = Gtk2::Gdk::Pixmap->create_from_xpm ($widget->window, undef, '/tmp/skin_xTunes.xpm'); ($pixmap, $pixmap_mask) = Gtk2::Gdk::Pixmap->create_from_xpm_d($widget->window, undef, @skin_xTunes); #my $pixmap_widget = Gtk2::Image->new_from_pixmap ($gdkpixmap, $mask); $window_cd_player->shape_combine_mask( $pixmap_mask, 0, 0 ) if not $window_cd_player->get_decorated; -- ###----------- add files to treeview --------------### sub sort_full_path_names{ my @array = @_; # For example: # $array[0] = '/tmp/teste/teste4/mus.mp3' # $array[1] = '/tmp/teste/teste2/teste4/mus.mp3' # $array[2] = '/tmp/mus.mp3' # First, sort this array in ascending order by number of '/' character. # Then, sort in case-insensitively mode. # sort case-insensitively : @articles = sort {uc($a) cmp uc($b)} @files; (see man perlfunc) # multiple comparisons in the routine and separate them with ||. # See Perl Cookbook, 2nd Edition. Chap. 4.16; 10.18 for help; #my $teste = '/tmp/teste/teste2/teste4/mus.mp3'; $teste =~ s/[^\/]//g; print "teste = $teste\n"; # output: teste = ///// # first compare the number of directory character '/'. sub compare_dir { (my $temp1 = $a) =~ s/[^\/]//g; # remove all character but '/' (my $temp2 = $b) =~ s/[^\/]//g; -- #This file 100% done All files 99% done # WaveGain Processing completed normally # No Title Gain adjustment or DC Offset correction required for file: # Error renaming '/tmp/wavegain.tmp' to '04.wav' (uh-oh) # Error processing GAIN for file - 04.wav #print "--> $_\n"; if ( $_ =~ /^\s+Applying Gain of ([-+]\d+[.,]\d+) dB to file:/ ){ $adjust = $1; } -- # leave room for WAV header (44 bytes) #seek WAV, 44, 0; #print "cdrom_rip = $cdrom_rip; value = $$addr[0]; addr = $addr; startframe = $startframe\n"; open WAV, ">/tmp/track${track}.wav" or die $!; binmode WAV; #print WAV $cdrom_rip; for (my $i=0;$i<2352;$i++){ print WAV $buf[$i]; } #syswrite(WAV, $buffer, 2352 );
fail hunspell-utils-1.7.0-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/wordforms: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/wordforms fx=0 case $1 in -s) fx=1; shift;; -p) fx=2; shift;; esac test -h /tmp/wordforms.aff && rm /tmp/wordforms.aff ln -s $PWD/$1 /tmp/wordforms.aff # prepared dic only with the query word echo 1 >/tmp/wordforms.dic grep "^$3/" $2 >>/tmp/wordforms.dic echo $3 | awk -v "fx=$fx" ' fx!=2 && FILENAME!="-" && /^SFX/ && NF > 4{split($4,a,"/");clen=($3=="0") ? 0 : length($3);sfx[a[1],clen]=a[1];sfxc[a[1],clen]=clen;next} fx!=1 && FILENAME!="-" && /^PFX/ && NF > 4{split($4,a,"/");clen=($3=="0") ? 0 : length($3);pfx[a[1],clen]=a[1];pfxc[a[1],clen]=clen;next} FILENAME=="-"{ wlen=length($1) -- for (j in pfx) {if (wlen<=pfxc[j]) continue; for(i in sfx){clen=sfxc[i];if (wlen<=clen || wlen <= (clen + pfxc[j]))continue; print (pfx[j]=="0" ? "" : pfx[j]) substr($1, pfxc[j]+1, wlen-clen-pfxc[j]) (sfx[i]=="0" ? "": sfx[i]) }} } } ' /tmp/wordforms.aff - | hunspell -d /tmp/wordforms -G -l
fail imapsync-1.945-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/imapsync: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/imapsync Readonly my $TRUE => 1 ; Readonly my $FALSE => 0 ; Readonly my $LAST_RESSORT_SEPARATOR => q{/} ; Readonly my $CGI_TMPDIR_TOP => '/var/tmp/imapsync_cgi' ; Readonly my $CGI_HASHFILE => '/var/tmp/imapsync_hash' ; Readonly my $UMASK_PARANO => '0077' ; Readonly my $STR_use_releasecheck => q{Check if a new imapsync release is available by adding --releasecheck} ; Readonly my $GMAIL_MAXSIZE => 35_651_584 ; -- # No pidfile $mysync->{pidfile} = q{} ; # No log $mysync->{log} = 0 ; # In case myprint( "Changing current directory to /var/tmp/\n" ) ; chdir '/var/tmp/' ; return ; } sub cgibegin -- SKIP: { if ( 'MSWin32' eq $OSNAME or '0' eq $EFFECTIVE_USER_ID ) { skip( 'Tests only for non-root Unix', 1 ) ; } $mysync->{ hashfile } = '/rrr' ; is( undef, hashsynclocal( $mysync ), 'hashsynclocal: permission denied' ) ; } ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'hashsynclocal: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; $mysync->{ hashfile } = 'W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash' ; ok( ! -e 'W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash' || unlink 'W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash', 'hashsynclocal: unlink W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash' ) ; ok( ! -e 'W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash', 'hashsynclocal: verify there is no W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash' ) ; is( 'ecdeb4ede672794d173da4e08c52b8ee19b7d252', hashsynclocal( $mysync, 'mukksyhpmbixkxkpjlqivmlqsulpictj' ), 'hashsynclocal: creating/reading W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash' ) ; # A second time now is( 'ecdeb4ede672794d173da4e08c52b8ee19b7d252', hashsynclocal( $mysync ), 'hashsynclocal: reading W/tmp/tests/imapsync_hash second time => same' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_hashsynclocal()' ) ; return ; } -- Readonly my $NB_UNIX_tests_do_valid_directory => 2 ; SKIP: { skip( 'Tests only for Unix', $NB_UNIX_tests_do_valid_directory ) if ( 'MSWin32' eq $OSNAME ) ; ok( 1 == do_valid_directory( '.'), 'do_valid_directory: . good' ) ; ok( 1 == do_valid_directory( './W/tmp/tests/valid/sub'), 'do_valid_directory: ./W/tmp/tests/valid/sub good' ) ; } Readonly my $NB_UNIX_tests_do_valid_directory_non_root => 2 ; SKIP: { skip( 'Tests only for Unix', $NB_UNIX_tests_do_valid_directory_non_root ) if ( 'MSWin32' eq $OSNAME or '0' eq $EFFECTIVE_USER_ID ) ; diag( 'Error / not writable is on purpose' ) ; -- sub tests_remove_pidfile_not_running { note( 'Entering tests_remove_pidfile_not_running()' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: no args => undef' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( './W' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: a dir => undef' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( 'noexists' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: noexists => undef' ) ; is( 1, touch( 'W/tmp/tests/empty.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: prepa empty W/tmp/tests/empty.pid' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( 'W/tmp/tests/empty.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: W/tmp/tests/empty.pid => undef' ) ; is( 'lalala', string_to_file( 'lalala', 'W/tmp/tests/lalala.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: prepa W/tmp/tests/lalala.pid' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( 'W/tmp/tests/lalala.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: W/tmp/tests/lalala.pid => undef' ) ; is( '55555', string_to_file( '55555', 'W/tmp/tests/notrunning.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: prepa W/tmp/tests/notrunning.pid' ) ; is( 1, remove_pidfile_not_running( 'W/tmp/tests/notrunning.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: W/tmp/tests/notrunning.pid => 1' ) ; is( $PROCESS_ID, string_to_file( $PROCESS_ID, 'W/tmp/tests/running.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: prepa W/tmp/tests/running.pid' ) ; is( undef, remove_pidfile_not_running( 'W/tmp/tests/running.pid' ), 'remove_pidfile_not_running: W/tmp/tests/running.pid => undef' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_remove_pidfile_not_running()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_tail { note( 'Entering tests_tail()' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'tail: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; ok( ( ! -e 'W/tmp/tests/tail.pid' || unlink 'W/tmp/tests/tail.pid' ), 'tail: unlink W/tmp/tests/tail.pid' ) ; ok( ( ! -e 'W/tmp/tests/tail.txt' || unlink 'W/tmp/tests/tail.txt' ), 'tail: unlink W/tmp/tests/tail.txt' ) ; is( undef, tail( ), 'tail: no args => undef' ) ; my $mysync ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: no pidfile => undef' ) ; $mysync->{pidfile} = 'W/tmp/tests/tail.pid' ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: no pidfilelocking => undef' ) ; $mysync->{pidfilelocking} = 1 ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: pidfile no exists => undef' ) ; my $pidandlog = "33333\nW/tmp/tests/tail.txt\n" ; is( $pidandlog, string_to_file( $pidandlog, $mysync->{pidfile} ), 'tail: put pid 33333 and tail.txt in pidfile' ) ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: logfile to tail no exists => undef' ) ; my $tailcontent = "L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\nL5\n" ; is( $tailcontent, string_to_file( $tailcontent, 'W/tmp/tests/tail.txt' ), 'tail: put L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\nL5\n in W/tmp/tests/tail.txt' ) ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: fake pid in pidfile + tail off => 1' ) ; $mysync->{ tail } = 1 ; is( 1, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: fake pid in pidfile + tail on=> 1' ) ; # put my own pid, won't do tail $pidandlog = "$PROCESS_ID\nW/tmp/tests/tail.txt\n" ; is( $pidandlog, string_to_file( $pidandlog, $mysync->{pidfile} ), 'tail: put my own PID in pidfile' ) ; is( undef, tail( $mysync ), 'tail: my own pid in pidfile => undef' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_tail()' ) ; return ; -- is( undef, write_pidfile( $mysync ), 'write_pidfile: no permission for /no/no/no.pid, no lock => undef' ) ; $mysync->{pidfilelocking} = 1 ; is( undef, write_pidfile( $mysync ), 'write_pidfile: no permission for /no/no/no.pid + lock => undef' ) ; $mysync->{pidfile} = 'W/tmp/tests/test.pid' ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'write_pidfile: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( 1, touch( $mysync->{pidfile} ), 'write_pidfile: lock prepa' ) ; $mysync->{pidfilelocking} = 0 ; is( 1, write_pidfile( $mysync ), 'write_pidfile: W/tmp/tests/test.pid + no lock => 1' ) ; is( $PROCESS_ID, firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/test.pid' ), "write_pidfile: W/tmp/tests/test.pid contains $PROCESS_ID" ) ; is( q{}, secondline( 'W/tmp/tests/test.pid' ), "write_pidfile: W/tmp/tests/test.pid contains no second line" ) ; $mysync->{pidfilelocking} = 1 ; is( undef, write_pidfile( $mysync ), 'write_pidfile: W/tmp/tests/test.pid + lock => undef' ) ; $mysync->{pidfilelocking} = 0 ; $mysync->{ logfile } = 'rrrr.txt' ; is( 1, write_pidfile( $mysync ), 'write_pidfile: W/tmp/tests/test.pid + no lock + logfile => 1' ) ; is( $PROCESS_ID, firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/test.pid' ), "write_pidfile: + no lock + logfile W/tmp/tests/test.pid contains $PROCESS_ID" ) ; is( q{rrrr.txt}, secondline( 'W/tmp/tests/test.pid' ), "write_pidfile: + no lock + logfile W/tmp/tests/test.pid contains rrrr.txt" ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_write_pidfile()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_get_cache { note( 'Entering tests_get_cache()' ) ; ok( not( get_cache('/cache_no_exist') ), 'get_cache: /cache_no_exist' ); ok( ( not -d 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2' or rmtree( 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2' ) ), 'get_cache: rmtree W/tmp/cache/F1/F2' ) ; ok( mkpath( 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2' ), 'get_cache: mkpath W/tmp/cache/F1/F2' ) ; my @test_files_cache = ( qw( W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/100_200 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/101_201 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/120_220 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/142_242 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/143_243 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/177_277 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/177_377 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/177_777 W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/155_255 ) ) ; ok( touch( @test_files_cache ), 'get_cache: touch W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/...' ) ; # on cache: 100_200 101_201 142_242 143_243 177_277 177_377 177_777 155_255 # on live: my $msgs_1 = [120, 142, 143, 144, 177 ]; -- my $msgs_all_1 = { 120 => 0, 142 => 0, 143 => 0, 144 => 0, 177 => 0 } ; my $msgs_all_2 = { 242 => 0, 243 => 0, 299 => 0, 377 => 0, 777 => 0, 255 => 0 } ; my( $c12, $c21 ) ; ok( ( $c12, $c21 ) = get_cache( 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2', $msgs_1, $msgs_2, $msgs_all_1, $msgs_all_2 ), 'get_cache: 02' ); my $a1 = [ sort { $a <=> $b } keys %{ $c12 } ] ; my $a2 = [ sort { $a <=> $b } keys %{ $c21 } ] ; ok( 0 == compare_lists( [ 142, 143, 177 ], $a1 ), 'get_cache: 03' ); ok( 0 == compare_lists( [ 242, 243, 777 ], $a2 ), 'get_cache: 04' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/142_242', 'get_cache: file kept 142_242'); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/142_242', 'get_cache: file kept 143_243'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/100_200', 'get_cache: file removed 100_200'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/101_201', 'get_cache: file removed 101_201'); # test clean_cache executed $maxage = 2 ; ok( touch(@test_files_cache), 'get_cache: touch W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/...' ) ; ok( ( $c12, $c21 ) = get_cache('W/tmp/cache/F1/F2', $msgs_1, $msgs_2, $msgs_all_1, $msgs_all_2 ), 'get_cache: 02' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/142_242', 'get_cache: file kept 142_242'); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/142_242', 'get_cache: file kept 143_243'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/100_200', 'get_cache: file NOT removed 100_200'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/F1/F2/101_201', 'get_cache: file NOT removed 101_201'); # strange files #$debugcache = 1 ; $maxage = undef ; ok( ( not -d 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee' or rmtree( 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee' )), 'get_cache: rmtree W/tmp/cache/rr\uee' ) ; ok( mkpath( 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee' ), 'get_cache: mkpath W/tmp/cache/rr\uee' ) ; @test_files_cache = ( qw( W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/100_200 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/101_201 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/120_220 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/142_242 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/143_243 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/177_277 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/177_377 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/177_777 W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/155_255 ) ) ; ok( touch(@test_files_cache), 'get_cache: touch strange W/tmp/cache/...' ) ; # on cache: 100_200 101_201 142_242 143_243 177_277 177_377 177_777 155_255 # on live: $msgs_1 = [120, 142, 143, 144, 177 ] ; $msgs_2 = [ 242, 243, 299, 377, 777, 255 ] ; $msgs_all_1 = { 120 => q{}, 142 => q{}, 143 => q{}, 144 => q{}, 177 => q{} } ; $msgs_all_2 = { 242 => q{}, 243 => q{}, 299 => q{}, 377 => q{}, 777 => q{}, 255 => q{} } ; ok( ( $c12, $c21 ) = get_cache('W/tmp/cache/rr\uee', $msgs_1, $msgs_2, $msgs_all_1, $msgs_all_2), 'get_cache: strange path 02' ); $a1 = [ sort { $a <=> $b } keys %{ $c12 } ] ; $a2 = [ sort { $a <=> $b } keys %{ $c21 } ] ; ok( 0 == compare_lists( [ 142, 143, 177 ], $a1 ), 'get_cache: strange path 03' ); ok( 0 == compare_lists( [ 242, 243, 777 ], $a2 ), 'get_cache: strange path 04' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/142_242', 'get_cache: strange path file kept 142_242'); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/142_242', 'get_cache: strange path file kept 143_243'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/100_200', 'get_cache: strange path file removed 100_200'); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/rr\uee/101_201', 'get_cache: strange path file removed 101_201'); note( 'Leaving tests_get_cache()' ) ; return ; } -- ok( ( $tuid1, $tuid2 ) = match_a_cache_file( '123_456' ), 'match_a_cache_file: 123_456' ) ; ok( '123' eq $tuid1, 'match_a_cache_file: 123_456 1' ) ; ok( '456' eq $tuid2, 'match_a_cache_file: 123_456 2' ) ; ok( ( $tuid1, $tuid2 ) = match_a_cache_file( '/tmp/truc/123_456' ), 'match_a_cache_file: /tmp/truc/123_456' ) ; ok( '123' eq $tuid1, 'match_a_cache_file: /tmp/truc/123_456 1' ) ; ok( '456' eq $tuid2, 'match_a_cache_file: /tmp/truc/123_456 2' ) ; ok( ( $tuid1, $tuid2 ) = match_a_cache_file( '/lala123_456' ), 'match_a_cache_file: NO /lala123_456' ) ; ok( ! $tuid1, 'match_a_cache_file: /lala123_456 1' ) ; ok( ! $tuid2, 'match_a_cache_file: /lala123_456 2' ) ; -- sub tests_clean_cache { note( 'Entering tests_clean_cache()' ) ; ok( ( not -d 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' or rmtree( 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' )), 'clean_cache: rmtree W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ) ; ok( mkpath( 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ), 'clean_cache: mkpath W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ) ; my @test_files_cache = ( qw( W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/101_201 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/120_220 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/143_243 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255 ) ) ; ok( touch(@test_files_cache), 'clean_cache: touch W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/...' ) ; ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200', 'clean_cache: 100_200 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242', 'clean_cache: 142_242 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277', 'clean_cache: 177_277 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377', 'clean_cache: 177_377 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777', 'clean_cache: 177_777 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255', 'clean_cache: 155_255 before' ); my $cache = { 142 => 242, 177 => 777, } ; -- 242 => q{}, 777 => q{}, } ; ok( clean_cache( \@test_files_cache, $cache, $all_1, $all_2 ), 'clean_cache: ' ) ; ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200', 'clean_cache: 100_200 after' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242', 'clean_cache: 142_242 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277', 'clean_cache: 177_277 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377', 'clean_cache: 177_377 after' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777', 'clean_cache: 177_777 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255', 'clean_cache: 155_255 after' ); note( 'Leaving tests_clean_cache()' ) ; return ; } sub tests_clean_cache_2 { note( 'Entering tests_clean_cache_2()' ) ; ok( ( not -d 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' or rmtree( 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' )), 'clean_cache_2: rmtree W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ) ; ok( mkpath( 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ), 'clean_cache_2: mkpath W/tmp/cache/G1/G2' ) ; my @test_files_cache = ( qw( W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/101_201 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/120_220 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/143_243 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777 W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255 ) ) ; ok( touch(@test_files_cache), 'clean_cache_2: touch W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/...' ) ; ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200', 'clean_cache_2: 100_200 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242', 'clean_cache_2: 142_242 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277', 'clean_cache_2: 177_277 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377', 'clean_cache_2: 177_377 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777', 'clean_cache_2: 177_777 before' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255', 'clean_cache_2: 155_255 before' ); my $cache = { 142 => 242, 177 => 777, } ; -- ok( clean_cache( \@test_files_cache, $cache, $all_1, $all_2 ), 'clean_cache_2: ' ) ; ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/100_200', 'clean_cache_2: 100_200 after' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/142_242', 'clean_cache_2: 142_242 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_277', 'clean_cache_2: 177_277 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_377', 'clean_cache_2: 177_377 after' ); ok( -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/177_777', 'clean_cache_2: 177_777 after' ); ok( ! -f 'W/tmp/cache/G1/G2/155_255', 'clean_cache_2: 155_255 after' ); note( 'Leaving tests_clean_cache_2()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_mkpath { note( 'Entering tests_mkpath()' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' )), 'mkpath: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; SKIP: { skip( 'Tests only for Unix', 10 ) if ( 'MSWin32' eq $OSNAME ) ; my $long_path_unix = '123456789/' x 30 ; ok( ( -d "W/tmp/tests/long/$long_path_unix" or mkpath( "W/tmp/tests/long/$long_path_unix" ) ), 'mkpath: mkpath 300 char' ) ; ok( -d "W/tmp/tests/long/$long_path_unix", 'mkpath: mkpath > 300 char verified' ) ; ok( ( -d "W/tmp/tests/long/$long_path_unix" and rmtree( 'W/tmp/tests/long/' ) ), 'mkpath: rmtree 300 char' ) ; ok( ! -d "W/tmp/tests/long/$long_path_unix", 'mkpath: rmtree 300 char verified' ) ; ok( ( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' ) ), 'mkpath: mkpath trailing_dots...' ) ; ok( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...', 'mkpath: mkpath trailing_dots... verified' ) ; ok( ( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' and rmtree( 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' ) ), 'mkpath: rmtree trailing_dots...' ) ; ok( ! -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...', 'mkpath: rmtree trailing_dots... verified' ) ; eval { ok( 1 / 0, 'mkpath: divide by 0' ) ; } or ok( 1, 'mkpath: can not divide by 0' ) ; ok( 1, 'mkpath: still alive' ) ; } ; -- eval { ok( ( -d $long_path_300 or mkpath( $long_path_300 ) ), 'mkpath: create a path with 300 characters' ) ; } or ok( 1, 'mkpath: can not create a path with 300 characters' ) ; ok( ( ( ! -d $long_path_300 ) or -d $long_path_300 and rmtree( $long_path_300 ) ), 'mkpath: rmtree the 300 character path' ) ; ok( 1, 'mkpath: still alive' ) ; ok( ( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' ) ), 'mkpath: mkpath trailing_dots...' ) ; ok( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...', 'mkpath: mkpath trailing_dots... verified' ) ; ok( ( -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' and rmtree( 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...' ) ), 'mkpath: rmtree trailing_dots...' ) ; ok( ! -d 'W/tmp/tests/trailing_dots...', 'mkpath: rmtree trailing_dots... verified' ) ; } ; note( 'Leaving tests_mkpath()' ) ; -- sub tests_touch { note( 'Entering tests_touch()' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' )), 'touch: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; ok( 1 == touch( 'W/tmp/tests/lala'), 'touch: W/tmp/tests/lala') ; ok( 1 == touch( 'W/tmp/tests/\y'), 'touch: W/tmp/tests/\y') ; ok( 0 == touch( '/no/no/no/aaa'), 'touch: not /aaa') ; ok( 1 == touch( 'W/tmp/tests/lili', 'W/tmp/tests/lolo'), 'touch: 2 files') ; ok( 0 == touch( 'W/tmp/tests/\y', '/no/no/aaa'), 'touch: 2 files, 1 fails' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_touch()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_firstline { note( 'Entering tests_firstline()' ) ; is( q{}, firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ), 'firstline: getting empty string from inexisting W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'firstline: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( "blabla\n" , string_to_file( "blabla\n", 'W/tmp/tests/firstline.txt' ), 'firstline: put blabla in W/tmp/tests/firstline.txt' ) ; is( 'blabla' , firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/firstline.txt' ), 'firstline: get blabla from W/tmp/tests/firstline.txt' ) ; is( q{} , string_to_file( q{}, 'W/tmp/tests/firstline2.txt' ), 'firstline: put empty string in W/tmp/tests/firstline2.txt' ) ; is( q{} , firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/firstline2.txt' ), 'firstline: get empty string from W/tmp/tests/firstline2.txt' ) ; is( "\n" , string_to_file( "\n", 'W/tmp/tests/firstline3.txt' ), 'firstline: put CR in W/tmp/tests/firstline3.txt' ) ; is( q{} , firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/firstline3.txt' ), 'firstline: get empty string from W/tmp/tests/firstline3.txt' ) ; is( "blabla\nTiti\n" , string_to_file( "blabla\nTiti\n", 'W/tmp/tests/firstline4.txt' ), 'firstline: put blabla\nTiti\n in W/tmp/tests/firstline4.txt' ) ; is( 'blabla' , firstline( 'W/tmp/tests/firstline4.txt' ), 'firstline: get blabla from W/tmp/tests/firstline4.txt' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_firstline()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_secondline { note( 'Entering tests_secondline()' ) ; is( q{}, secondline( 'W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ), 'secondline: getting empty string from inexisting W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ) ; is( q{}, secondline( 'W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt', 2 ), 'secondline: 2nd getting empty string from inexisting W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'secondline: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( "L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n" , string_to_file( "L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n", 'W/tmp/tests/secondline.txt' ), 'secondline: put L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n in W/tmp/tests/secondline.txt' ) ; is( 'L2' , secondline( 'W/tmp/tests/secondline.txt' ), 'secondline: get L2 from W/tmp/tests/secondline.txt' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_secondline()' ) ; return ; } -- sub tests_nthline { note( 'Entering tests_nthline()' ) ; is( q{}, nthline( 'W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ), 'nthline: getting empty string from inexisting W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ) ; is( q{}, nthline( 'W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt', 2 ), 'nthline: 2nd getting empty string from inexisting W/tmp/tests/noexist.txt' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'nthline: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( "L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n" , string_to_file( "L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n", 'W/tmp/tests/nthline.txt' ), 'nthline: put L1\nL2\nL3\nL4\n in W/tmp/tests/nthline.txt' ) ; is( 'L3' , nthline( 'W/tmp/tests/nthline.txt', 3 ), 'nthline: get L3 from W/tmp/tests/nthline.txt' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_nthline()' ) ; return ; } -- is( undef, file_to_string( ), 'file_to_string: no args => undef' ) ; is( undef, file_to_string( '/noexist' ), 'file_to_string: /noexist => undef' ) ; is( undef, file_to_string( '/' ), 'file_to_string: reading a directory => undef' ) ; ok( file_to_string( $PROGRAM_NAME ), 'file_to_string: reading myself' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'file_to_string: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( 'lilili', string_to_file( 'lilili', 'W/tmp/tests/canbewritten' ), 'file_to_string: string_to_file filling W/tmp/tests/canbewritten with lilili' ) ; is( 'lilili', file_to_string( 'W/tmp/tests/canbewritten' ), 'file_to_string: reading W/tmp/tests/canbewritten is lilili' ) ; is( q{}, string_to_file( q{}, 'W/tmp/tests/empty' ), 'file_to_string: string_to_file filling W/tmp/tests/empty with empty string' ) ; is( q{}, file_to_string( 'W/tmp/tests/empty' ), 'file_to_string: reading W/tmp/tests/empty is empty' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_file_to_string()' ) ; return ; } -- note( 'Entering tests_string_to_file()' ) ; is( undef, string_to_file( ), 'string_to_file: no args => undef' ) ; is( undef, string_to_file( 'lalala' ), 'string_to_file: one arg => undef' ) ; is( undef, string_to_file( 'lalala', '.' ), 'string_to_file: writing a directory => undef' ) ; ok( (-d 'W/tmp/tests/' or mkpath( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'string_to_file: mkpath W/tmp/tests/' ) ; is( 'lalala', string_to_file( 'lalala', 'W/tmp/tests/canbewritten' ), 'string_to_file: W/tmp/tests/canbewritten with lalala' ) ; is( q{}, string_to_file( q{}, 'W/tmp/tests/empty' ), 'string_to_file: W/tmp/tests/empty with empty string' ) ; SKIP: { Readonly my $NB_UNX_tests_string_to_file => 1 ; skip( 'Not on Unix non-root', $NB_UNX_tests_string_to_file ) if ('MSWin32' eq $OSNAME or '0' eq $EFFECTIVE_USER_ID ) ; is( undef, string_to_file( 'lalala', '/cantouch' ), 'string_to_file: /cantouch denied => undef' ) ; -- return backtick( $command ) ; } sub search_dyn_lib_locale_linux { my $command = qq{ lsof -p $PID | grep ' REG ' | grep -v '/tmp/par-' | grep '\.so' } ; myprint( "Search non embeded dynamic libs with the command: $command\n" ) ; return backtick( $command ) ; } sub search_dyn_lib_locale_MSWin32 -- sub tests_logfileprepa { note( 'Entering tests_logfileprepa()' ) ; is( undef, logfileprepa( ), 'logfileprepa: no args => undef' ) ; my $logfile = 'W/tmp/tests/tests_logfileprepa.txt' ; is( 1, logfileprepa( $logfile ), 'logfileprepa: W/tmp/tests/tests_logfileprepa.txt => 1' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_logfileprepa()' ) ; return ; } -- is( undef, teelaunch( ), 'teelaunch: no args => undef' ) ; my $mysync = {} ; is( undef, teelaunch( $mysync ), 'teelaunch: arg empty {} => undef' ) ; $mysync->{logfile} = '' ; is( undef, teelaunch( $mysync ), 'teelaunch: logfile empty string => undef' ) ; $mysync->{logfile} = 'W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt' ; isa_ok( my $tee = teelaunch( $mysync ), 'IO::Tee' , 'teelaunch: logfile W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt' ) ; is( 1, print( $tee "Hi!\n" ), 'teelaunch: write Hi!') ; is( "Hi!\n", file_to_string( 'W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt' ), 'teelaunch: reading W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt is Hi!\n' ) ; is( 1, print( $tee "Hoo\n" ), 'teelaunch: write Hoo') ; is( "Hi!\nHoo\n", file_to_string( 'W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt' ), 'teelaunch: reading W/tmp/tests/tests_teelaunch.txt is Hi!\nHoo\n' ) ; note( 'Leaving tests_teelaunch()' ) ; return ; } -- if ( ! $mysync->{ testsdebug } ) { skip 'No test in normal run' ; } note( 'Entering testsdebug()' ) ; ok( ( ( not -d 'W/tmp/tests' ) or rmtree( 'W/tmp/tests/' ) ), 'testsdebug: rmtree W/tmp/tests' ) ; tests_check_binary_embed_all_dyn_libs( ) ; note( 'Leaving testsdebug()' ) ; done_testing( ) ; } return ;
fail impose+-0.2-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/impose: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/impose $ybot=30 unless $ybot; $pages=6 unless defined $pages; $rotdir="L" unless $rotdir; $filename = shift or do { $filename = "/tmp/$ENV{USER}-tmp.ps"; open(TMP, ">$filename"); while(<>) { print TMP; } close(TMP); $do_stdout++; $do_erase_tmp++; -- $_=; @oddbbox=split; $_=; @evenbbox=split; @oddbbox = @evenbbox unless @evenbbox; close(BB); } elsif ($lastbbox && -e "/tmp/bboxx-$ENV{USER}") { open(BB,"/tmp/bboxx-$ENV{USER}"); $_=; @oddbbox=split; $_=; @evenbbox=split; close(BB); # print "oddbbox = @oddbbox\n"; # print "evenbbox = @evenbbox\n"; -- } @evenbbox = @oddbbox if $noevenodd; # record the bboxx information open(BB, ">/tmp/bboxx-$ENV{USER}"); print BB "@oddbbox\n@evenbbox\n"; close(BB); # Do page calculations $oddwidth = $oddbbox[2]-$oddbbox[0];
fail installer-distro-alt-server-v-stage2-9.0.0-alt3.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/install2/initinstall.d/05-vm-profile: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/install2/initinstall.d/05-vm-profile #!/bin/sh # see also http://www.altlinux.org/Autoinstall message() { echo "vm-profile: $*" >>/tmp/vm-profile.log; } mem="$(sed -n '/^MemTotal/s/[^0-9]//gp' /proc/meminfo)" # in kB max_disk="$(sort -rn /sys/block/[hsv]d*/size | head -1)" # in 512-byte sectors # feel free to suggest better defaults
fail installer-distro-altlinux-server-stage2-7.0.2-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/install2/initinstall.d/05-vm-profile: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/install2/initinstall.d/05-vm-profile #!/bin/sh # see also http://www.altlinux.org/Autoinstall message() { echo "vm-profile: $*" >>/tmp/vm-profile.log; } mem="$(sed -n '/^MemTotal/s/[^0-9]//gp' /proc/meminfo)" # in kB max_disk="$(sort -rn /sys/block/[hs]d*/size | head -1)" # in 512-byte sectors # feel free to suggest better defaults
fail installer-scripts-remount-stage2-0.5.17-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/sbin/install2-remount-functions: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/sbin/install2-remount-functions start_mdraid && start_lvm && start_luks && mount_chroot && set_active \ ) >& /tmp/remount.log || return $? } # avoid automatic rpm shell.req dependency MULTIPATHD=/sbin/multipathd MDADM=/sbin/mdadm LVM=/sbin/lvm CRYPTSETUP=/sbin/cryptsetup CRYPTSETUP_KEY=/tmp/empty PUTFILE=/usr/share/make-initrd/tools/put-file BLKID="blkid -c /dev/null" # alterator-vm should leave LUKS containers # with initial empty password, see #28200 -- # for installer-feature-desktop-other-fs, see also #29005 save_blkid_state() { find /dev/mapper -type l \ | xargs -r $BLKID \ > /tmp/blkid.dm } populate_fstab() { [ ! -f /tmp/fstab ] || cat /tmp/fstab >> "$destdir/etc/fstab" } copy_chroot_binaries() { useputfile= if [ -x "$destdir$PUTFILE" ]; then useputfile='yes' binddir="$(mktemp -d "$destdir/tmp/copy_chroot_binaries.XXXXXXXXX")" workdir="${binddir#$destdir}" mount --bind / "$binddir" else echo "remount: file does not exist or is not available for execution: $destdir$PUTFILE" >&2 fi -- stop_mdraid() { # saving state is only important *after* evms if [ -f /proc/mdstat -a -x "$MDADM" ]; then "$MDADM" --examine --scan \ | grep '^ARRAY /dev/md[0-9/]' > /tmp/mdadm.conf "$MDADM" --stop --scan fi } start_mdraid() { if [ -s /tmp/mdadm.conf -a -x "$MDADM" ]; then # an arbitrary value of the year: packages installed already sysctl -w dev.raid.speed_limit_max=1000000 # chroot's mdadm.conf populated by 45-mdadm.sh "$MDADM" --assemble --run --scan --config=/tmp/mdadm.conf ||: fi } start_multipath() { if [ -x "$MULTIPATHD" ]; then -- done fi } mount_chroot() { # depends on /tmp/fstab just like 10-fstab.sh rootfs="$(awk '{ if ($2=="/") print $1 }' < /tmp/fstab)" case "$rootfs" in UUID=*) rootfs="`$BLKID -U ${rootfs#UUID=}`" ;; LABEL=*)
fail kismet-common-2014.02.R1-alt2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/kismet-common-2014.02.R1/old/multi-gpsmap.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/kismet-common-2014.02.R1/old/multi-gpsmap.sh if [[ $lat != 0 ]]; then echo $lat cat > /dev/null break fi done > /tmp/mg$$ latitude=`cat /tmp/mg$$` bc -l << EOF > /tmp/mg$$ scale=3 c(($latitude etc usr 8 etc usr a(1))/360) EOF cos_lat=`cat /tmp/mg$$` rm /tmp/mg$$ awk '/gps-point/ { if ( $3 ~ "source.*" ) { print $6" "$7 } else { print $5" "$6 }}' < $1 | while read line; do eval $line echo $lat $lon done | awk -v cos_lat=$cos_lat -v scale=$scale 'BEGIN {olat=0}
fail ltp-20200515-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/sched_stress.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/sched_stress.sh # their bootfiles other locations. export KERNEL=./sched_datafile touch $KERNEL echo 0.000000 > sch.measure export RAWDEV=`df / | grep dev | awk {'print $1'}` sched_driver -s 0.9 -t 0.02 -p 2 > /tmp/tmp$$ tail -n 5 /tmp/tmp$$ rm -rf /tmp/tmp$$ ./sched_datafile sch.measure Found error in /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/run_io_throttle_test.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/run_io_throttle_test.sh echo "ERROR: could not set i/o bandwidth limit for cgroup-$i. Exiting test." cleanup exit 1 fi # exec i/o benchmark ./iobw -direct $tasks $BUFSIZE $DATASIZE > /tmp/$MYGROUP.out & PID[$i]=$! done /bin/echo $$ > /dev/blockioctl/tasks # wait for children completion -- if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then echo "ERROR: error code $ret during test $tasks.$strategy.$i. Exiting test." cleanup exit 1 fi iorate=`grep parent /tmp/${MYGROUP}.out | awk '{print $7}'` diff=$((${IOBW[$i]} - $iorate)) echo "($MYGROUP) i/o-bw ${IOBW[$i]} KiB/s, i/o-rate $iorate KiB/s, err $diff KiB/s" if [ ${IOBW[$i]} -ge $iorate ]; then echo "TPASS Block device I/O bandwidth controller: test $tasks.$strategy.$i PASSED"; else Found error in /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/run_cpuctl_test_fj.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/run_cpuctl_test_fj.sh export TCID="cpuctl_test_fj" export TST_TOTAL=22 export TST_COUNT=1 CPUCTL="/dev/cpuctl" CPUCTL_TMP="/tmp/cpuctl_tmp" SLEEP_SEC=5 # Create $CPUCTL & mount the cgroup file system with cpu controller # clean any group created earlier (if any) setup() -- then tst_resm TFAIL "Err: Init value is not 1024" return 1; fi ps -eo pid,rtprio > /tmp/pids_file1 & pspid=$! wait $pspid cat /tmp/pids_file1 | grep '-' | tr -d '-' | tr -d ' ' | \ grep -v "$pspid" > /tmp/pids_file2 while read pid do task=`cat $CPUCTL/tasks | grep "\b$pid\b"` if [ -z $task ] then tst_resm TFAIL "Err: Some normal tasks aren't in the root group" return 1 fi done < /tmp/pids_file2 } # create a child directory case2 () { -- return 1; fi [ -d "$CPUCTL/tmp" ] || return 1 [ -f "$CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares" ] || return 1 shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi task=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks` if [ "$task" != "" ] then return 1 fi } -- if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp/tmp1 if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi [ -d "$CPUCTL/tmp/tmp1" ] || return 1 [ -f "$CPUCTL/tmp/tmp1/cpu.shares" ] || return 1 shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/tmp1/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi task=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/tmp1/tasks` if [ "$task" != "" ] then return 1 fi } -- if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi echo 1 > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi tasks=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks` if [ $tasks -ne 1 ] then return 1; fi } -- if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_simple_echo 3 $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks if [ $? -ne 22 ] # define EINVAL 22 /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Invalid argument usr/ then return 1; fi tasks=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks` if [ "$tasks" != "" ] then return 1; fi } -- # echo negative into shares case7 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp ./cpuctl_fj_simple_echo -1 $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 22 ] # define EINVAL 22 /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Invalid argument usr/ then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo 0 into shares case8 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo 0 > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 2 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo 1 into shares case9 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo 1 > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 2 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo 2 into shares case10 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo 2 > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 2 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo 3 into shares case11 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo 3 > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 3 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo 2048 into shares case12 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo 2048 > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 2048 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo MAX_SHARES into shares case13 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo $max_shares > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ "$shares" != "$max_shares" ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo MAX_SHARES+1 into shares case14 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp echo $(($max_shares+1)) > $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 0 ] then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ "$shares" != "$max_shares" ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo float number into shares case15 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp ./cpuctl_fj_simple_echo 2048.23 $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 22 ] # define EINVAL 22 /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Invalid argument usr/ then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # charactor. case16 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp ./cpuctl_fj_simple_echo 2048ABC $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 22 ] # define EINVAL 22 /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Invalid argument usr/ then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid -- # echo a string into shares. This string begins with charactors. case17 () { mkdir $CPUCTL/tmp ./cpuctl_fj_simple_echo ABC $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares if [ $? -ne 22 ] # define EINVAL 22 /ALT /bin /boot /dev /etc /home /lib /lib64 /libx32 /media /mnt /opt /proc /root /run /sbin /selinux /srv /sys /tmp /usr /var Invalid argument usr/ then return 1; fi shares=`cat $CPUCTL/tmp/cpu.shares` if [ $shares -ne 1024 ] then return 1; fi ./cpuctl_fj_cpu-hog & pid=$! echo $pid > $CPUCTL/tmp/tasks /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid sleep $SLEEP_SEC /bin/kill -s SIGUSR1 $pid wait $pid Found error in /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/smack_file_access.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/ltp/testcases/bin/smack_file_access.sh testfile="testfile" tst_tmpdir TST_CLEANUP=cleanup smack_notroot /bin/sh -c "echo InitialData 2>/tmp/smack_fail.log > $testfile" if [ ! -f "$testfile" ]; then tst_brkm TFAIL "Test file \"$testfile\" can not be created." fi setfattr --name=security.SMACK64 --value=TheOther "$testfile"
fail lua5.1-module-luasocket-3.0rc1-alt4_lr2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/luarocks/rocks-5.1/luasocket/3.0rc1-2/test/cgi/cat: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/luarocks/rocks-5.1/luasocket/3.0rc1-2/test/cgi/cat #!/bin/sh echo Content-type: text/plain echo cat > /tmp/luasocket.cat.tmp cat /tmp/luasocket.cat.tmp
fail lua5.3-module-luasocket-3.0rc1-alt4_lr2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/luarocks/rocks-5.3/luasocket/3.0rc1-2/test/cgi/cat: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/luarocks/rocks-5.3/luasocket/3.0rc1-2/test/cgi/cat #!/bin/sh echo Content-type: text/plain echo cat > /tmp/luasocket.cat.tmp cat /tmp/luasocket.cat.tmp
fail lz11-V2-1.2-alt1.qa1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/lz11.stopjobs: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/lz11.stopjobs if [ -z "${pids}" ] ; then exit 0 fi echo "${pids}" > /tmp/lz11.terminate waitcounts=30 echo echo echo "removing all active printer jobs for --$(whoami)-- " echo " etc usr with PIDS ${pids}" -- if [ ${nonefound} == 1 ] ; then i=${waitcounts} echo -n " STOPPED!" fi done rm -f /tmp/lz11.terminate echo if [ ${nonefound} = 0 ] ; then echo "The program could not stop the prints safely." echo "Just killing the print processes now!" echo Found error in /usr/bin/lz11.foomatic: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/lz11.foomatic $debug = 1; local *ERR; if ($debug) { open(ERR,">>/tmp/lz11err"); print ERR "-----------\n"; print ERR "@ARGV\n"; } else { open(ERR, ">&STDERR"); } -- # ---------------------------------------------------------- # cZ11 command line # ---------------------------------------------------------- $cz11 = "cZ11-V2 $devicez11 $sizez11 $adjustz11"; if ( $cancel == 1 ) { $cz11 = "$cz11"." --terminate=/tmp/lz11.terminate"; } elsif ( $cancel ) { $cz11 = "$cz11"." --terminate-eject=/tmp/lz11.terminate"; } $cz11 = "$cz11"." 2>>/tmp/lz11err"; # ---------------------------------------------------------- # Do it! # ---------------------------------------------------------- $invokation = "$gs -q -dBATCH -dSAFER -dNOPAUSE $devicegs $ditherppi $resgs $sizegs -sOutputFile=- - | $cz11"; if ($debug) { print ERR "$invokation \n"; } system("$invokation"); system("chmod a+rw /tmp/lz11*"); close(ERR);
fail m2300w-0.51-alt1.qa1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/m2300w-wrapper: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/m2300w-wrapper # is heavy based on the Script from Rick's 'foo2zjs-wrapper' for the # Minolta Magiccolor 2300DL. # So i will leave his copyright on it. #********************************************************************* cat >> /tmp/m2300w.log <> /tmp/m2300w.log <>/tmp/m2300w.log) 3>&1 | tee /tmp/m2300w_gsout.pbm | $DRIVER $DRIVER_DEBUG $M2300WUCR $SAVETONER $PAPERCODE $MEDIACODE \ -i - -o - $COLOR $RESCODESTR | tee /tmp/m2300w.prn EOF $PREFILTER | ($GS $gsPaperCode $RES $GSDEV $GSOPT \ -sOutputFile="|cat 1>&3" $RENDERFILES - >>/tmp/m2300w.log) 3>&1 | tee_pbm | $DRIVER $DRIVER_DEBUG $M2300WUCR $SAVETONER $PAPERCODE $MEDIACODE \ -i - -o - $COLOR $RESCODESTR | tee_prn
fail make-initrd-colaboot-0.5-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/make-initrd/features/colaboot/data/scripts/post/udev/colaboot: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/make-initrd/features/colaboot/data/scripts/post/udev/colaboot REPLACEMENT=$(echo $ROOT |sed -r -e 's|(.*)/.*|\1|') elif echo $MACRO_NAME |grep -q "^DHCP_"; then # for this macro type we need to make sure first that network is up [ -z "$NETWORK_IS_UP" ] && network_init >&2 DHCP_OPT_NAME=$(echo $MACRO_NAME |sed -e 's/^DHCP_//') REPLACEMENT=$(get_mnf_param $DHCP_OPT_NAME /tmp/lease-info |sed -e "s/'//g") fi STR=$(echo $STR |sed -e "s|{.*}|$REPLACEMENT|") fi echo $STR } -- done } network_init() { if [ -s /tmp/lease-info ]; then # It seems network is already up NETWORK_IS_UP=1 return fi -- fi sleep .1 done if ip -o -4 addr list |grep -Fqv "inet 127.0.0.1"; then verbose "Save lease info into /tmp/lease-info" for lease in /var/lib/dhcpcd/*.lease; do iface=$(basename $lease |sed -e 's/dhcpcd-//' -e 's/\.lease$//') dhcpcd -4 -U $iface > /tmp/lease-info done NETWORK_IS_UP=1 else error "No assigned IP found. Network problem?" fi -- FORCE_CACHE_IMAGES=${clb_force_cache_images:-1} WAIT_DELAY=${ROOTDELAY:-180} verbose "CoLaBoot: root url=${ROOT}, clb_fs_size=${clb_fs_size}, clb_force_cache_images=${FORCE_CACHE_IMAGES}" RDISK=/tmp/clb-ramdisk CACHED_IMAGES=$RDISK/cached-images IMAGES_MPOINTS=$RDISK/mount-points IMG_FS_PATH=/tmp/images-fs # this location can be overrided for local HDD, NFS or iSCSI RW_LAYER_PATH=$IMAGES_MPOINTS mkdir -p $RDISK -- for MPOINT in $IMG_FS_PATH/*; do grep -q " $MPOINT " /proc/mounts && umount -l $MPOINT done [ -n "$NETWORK_IS_UP" -o -s /tmp/lease-info ] && network_down } # =========< start here >============= prepare
fail ndiswrapper-1.61-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/sbin/ndiswrapper-buginfo: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/sbin/ndiswrapper-buginfo # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software # Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA LOGFILE=`mktemp /tmp/ndiswrapper.XXXXXX` KVERS=`uname -r` log() { echo -e "$*" 2>&1 >> $LOGFILE -- log "kernel config missing" fi fi fi gzip -c $LOGFILE > /tmp/ndiswrapper-buginfo.gz echo "please attach /tmp/ndiswrapper-buginfo.gz to your bugreport!" \rm -f $LOGFILE
fail netdata-1.23.0-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/netdata/plugins.d/health-cmdapi-test.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/netdata/plugins.d/health-cmdapi-test.sh d['alarms']['system.cpu.10min_cpu_iowait']['silenced'], \ d['alarms']['system.load.load_trigger']['disabled'], \ d['alarms']['system.load.load_trigger']['silenced'], \ );" 2>&1) if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then echo -e " ${RED}ERROR: Unexpected response stored in /tmp/resp-$number.json" echo "$resp" > /tmp/resp-$number.json err=$((err+1)) iter=0 elif [ "${r}" != "${2}" ] ; then echo -e " ${GRAY}WARNING: 'Got ${r}'. Expected '${2}'" iter=$((iter+1))
fail netinst-overlays-0.03-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/overlays-manage: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/overlays-manage ExCmd() { # archive file local D D="`mktemp -d`" unsquashfs -d "$D/1" "$1" "$2" cat "$D/1/$2" find "$D" >> /tmp/log 2>&1 rm -rf "$D" } EXTMP= ADDHOSTS="" # what hosts want their hostkey on diskless DST="`logname`@`hostname`" # where to copy overlays
fail ocsinventory-agent-2.6.1-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/ocsinventory-agent: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/ocsinventory-agent =item B<--stdout> Print the inventory on stdout. % ocsinventory-agent --stdout > /tmp/report.xml # prepare an inventory and write it in the /tmp/report.xml file. # A file will be created. =item B<--scan-homedirs> Authorized OCS to scan home directories to increase the Virtual Machine inventory.
fail otl-0.54-alt1.qa1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/otl: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/otl #### # # need to rewrite and reread file so that \n's are now processed correctly # and each line ends up as a separate array element # -- write it to temp file open(FOUT, ">/tmp/tmp.otl"); flock(FOUT,2); print FOUT @linesout; close (FOUT); # now read it @linesout=(); open(INFO,"/tmp/tmp.otl"); @linesout=; close(INFO); $lineslength=@linesout; if ($debug) Found error in /usr/bin/otlsub: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/otlsub ################################### # need to rewrite and reread file so that \n's are now processed correctly # and each line ends up as a separate array element # -- write it to temp file unlink("/tmp/tmp.otl"); open(FOUT, ">/tmp/tmp.otl"); flock(FOUT,2); print FOUT @linesout; close (FOUT); # now read it @linesout=(); open(INFO,"/tmp/tmp.otl"); @linesout=; close(INFO); # # $llength is length of linesout
fail perl-Tapper-Cmd-5.0.11-alt1_1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/perl5/auto/Tapper/Cmd/Init/hello-world/run-hello-world.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/perl5/auto/Tapper/Cmd/Init/hello-world/run-hello-world.sh start-tapper-daemon () { DAEMON=$1 if ps auxwww | grep -v grep | grep $DAEMON ; then kill $(ps auxwww | grep -v grep | grep $DAEMON | awk '{print $2}') fi $DAEMON > /tmp/$DAEMON-helloworld.log 2>&1 & } start-tapper-daemon tapper_reports_web_server.pl start-tapper-daemon tapper-reports-receiver start-tapper-daemon tapper-reports-api
fail pptpd-1.4.0-alt3.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/pptpd-1.4.0/tools/vpnuser: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/pptpd-1.4.0/tools/vpnuser exit 1 fi ;; del) if [ "$(echo $2)" != "" ]; then grep -vw "$2" $config > /tmp/vpnblaat mv /tmp/vpnblaat $config chmod 600 $config else echo -e $ERROR exit 1 fi -- cat $config fi ;; domain) if [ "$(echo $2)" != "" ] & [ "$(echo $3)" != "" ]; then grep -vw "$2" $config > /tmp/vpnblaat DATA=`grep -w "$2" $config` mv /tmp/vpnblaat $config DOM=`echo $3 | tr a-z A-Z` dom=`echo $3 | tr A-Z a-z` echo "$DOM\\\\$DATA" >> $config echo "$dom\\\\$DATA" >> $config chmod 600 $config
fail rabbitmq-server-3.8.3-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib/ocf/resource.d/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server-ha: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib/ocf/resource.d/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server-ha The debug flag for agent (${OCF_RESKEY_binary}) instance. In the /tmp/ directory will be created rmq-* files for log some operations and ENV values inside OCF-script. AMQP server (${OCF_RESKEY_binary}) debug flag -- local rc=$OCF_ERR_GENERIC local LH="${LL} monitor:" ocf_log debug "${LH} action start." if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_debug}" = 'true' ] ; then d=`date '+%Y%m%d %H:%M:%S'` echo $d >> /tmp/rmq-monitor.log env >> /tmp/rmq-monitor.log echo "$d [monitor] start='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_start_uname}' stop='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_stop_uname}' active='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_active_uname}' inactive='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_inactive_uname}'" >> /tmp/rmq-ocf.log fi get_monitor rc=$? ocf_log debug "${LH} role: ${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_role}" ocf_log debug "${LH} result: $rc" -- local LH="${LL} start:" local nowtime if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_debug}" = 'true' ] ; then d=`date '+%Y%m%d %H:%M:%S'` echo $d >> /tmp/rmq-start.log env >> /tmp/rmq-start.log echo "$d [start] start='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_start_uname}' stop='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_stop_uname}' active='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_active_uname}' inactive='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_inactive_uname}'" >> /tmp/rmq-ocf.log fi ocf_log info "${LH} action begin." get_status -- local rc=$OCF_ERR_GENERIC local LH="${LL} stop:" if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_debug}" = 'true' ] ; then d=$(date '+%Y%m%d %H:%M:%S') echo $d >> /tmp/rmq-stop.log env >> /tmp/rmq-stop.log echo "$d [stop] start='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_start_uname}' stop='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_stop_uname}' active='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_active_uname}' inactive='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_inactive_uname}'" >> /tmp/rmq-ocf.log fi ocf_log info "${LH} action begin." ocf_log info "${LH} Deleting master attribute" -- local LH="${LL} notify:" local nodelist if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_debug}" = 'true' ] ; then d=`date '+%Y%m%d %H:%M:%S'` echo $d >> /tmp/rmq-notify.log env >> /tmp/rmq-notify.log echo "$d [notify] ${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_type}-${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_operation} promote='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_promote_uname}' demote='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_demote_uname}' master='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_master_uname}' slave='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_slave_uname}' start='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_start_uname}' stop='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_stop_uname}' active='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_active_uname}' inactive='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_inactive_uname}'" >> /tmp/rmq-ocf.log fi if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_type}" = 'post' ] ; then # POST- anything notify section case "$OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_operation" in -- local rc=$OCF_ERR_GENERIC local LH="${LL} promote:" if [ "${OCF_RESKEY_debug}" = 'true' ] ; then d=$(date '+%Y%m%d %H:%M:%S') echo $d >> /tmp/rmq-promote.log env >> /tmp/rmq-promote.log echo "$d [promote] start='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_start_uname}' stop='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_stop_uname}' active='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_active_uname}' inactive='${OCF_RESKEY_CRM_meta_notify_inactive_uname}'" >> /tmp/rmq-ocf.log fi ocf_log info "${LH} action begin." get_monitor
fail rancid-2.3.8-alt2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/rancid-2.3.8/getipacctg: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/rancid-2.3.8/getipacctg # will display the top 25 for src or dst ip's within prefix # 192.168.0.0/24 # # Contributed to rancid by Steve Neighorn of SCN Reasearch. TMP="/tmp/ipacct.$$.prefixes" TMP2="/tmp/ipacct.$$.sorted" TMP3="/tmp/ipacct.$$.pl" if [ $# -eq 0 ] ; then echo "usage: getipacctg router_name [] [ [...]]" >&2 exit 1; fi trap 'rm -fr /tmp/ipacct.$$ $TMP $TMP2 $TMP3;' 1 2 15 clogin -c 'show ip accounting' $1 > /tmp/ipacct.$$ if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then echo "clogin failed." >&2 exit 1 fi -- fi shift done 6>&- egrep '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+ +[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.' /tmp/ipacct.$$ | \ sed -e 's/^ *//' -e 's/ etc/ usr/ var/ /g' -e 's/.$//' | \ awk '{print $4":"$0;}' | sort -nr | \ sed -e 's/^[^:]*://' > $TMP2 if [ -s $TMP ] ; then -- perl $TMP3 $TMP $TMP2 | $HEAD else $HEAD $TMP2 fi rm -fr /tmp/ipacct.$$ $TMP $TMP2 $TMP3 trap ';' 1 2 15 exit 0
fail scanbuttond-0.2.3-alt4.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /etc/scanbuttond/buttonpressed.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /etc/scanbuttond/buttonpressed.sh # $1 ... the button number # $2 ... the scanner's SANE device name, which comes in handy if there are two or # more scanners. In this case we can pass the device name to SANE programs # like scanimage. TMPFILE="/tmp/scan.tiff" LOCKFILE="/tmp/copy.lock" case $1 in 1) echo "button 1 has been pressed on $2" -- # echo "Error: Another scanning operation is currently in progress" # exit # fi # touch $LOCKFILE # rm -f $TMPFILE scanimage --device-name $2 -x 215 -y 297 1> /tmp/image.pnm A= gimp /tmp/image.pnm # tiff2ps -z -w 8.27 -h 11.69 $TMPFILE | lpr # rm -f $LOCKFILE # ;; 2) echo "button 2 has been pressed on $2" scanimage --device-name $2 -x 215 -y 297 1> /tmp/image.pnm lpr /tmp/image.pnm ;; 3) echo "button 3 has been pressed on $2" scanimage --device-name $2 -x 215 -y 297 1> /tmp/image.pnm A= evolution mailto:?attach=/tmp/image.pnm ;; 4) echo "button 4 has been pressed on $2" ;; esac
fail select-kernel-0.99.2-alt1.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/sbin/select-kernel: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/sbin/select-kernel message() { printf %s\\n "$PROG: $*" >&2 } debug() { echo "$@" >> /tmp/$PROG.dbg } show_help() { cat << EOF -- yes= numeric= RELEASE=. FLAVOUR=. CACHE=/tmp/$PROG.$$ trap "rm -f $CACHE" EXIT SIGHUP SIGINT SIGQUIT SIGTERM while [ -n "$1" ]; do if [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then show_help
fail sensorfw-contextfw-tests-0.7.2-alt3.qa1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/sensorfw-contextfw-tests/testorientation-manual.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/sensorfw-contextfw-tests/testorientation-manual.sh ## Contact: Tapio Rantala ## INPUT_DEV_NUM=`ls /sys/class/input/event?/device/name | xargs grep -i accelerometer | cut -c23` INPUT_DEV=/dev/input/event${INPUT_DEV_NUM} FIFO=/tmp/accelerometer echo "Faking input device $INPUT_DEV" if [ ! -e $FIFO ] ; then echo "Created $FIFO for testing" -- /sbin/service sensord stop > /dev/null 2>&1 sleep 2 killall sensord > /dev/null 2>&1 # Start sensord manually to load libsensorfakeopen.so env LD_PRELOAD=libsensorfakeopen.so /usr/sbin/sensord > /tmp/sensord.test.log 2>&1 & # If we don't input something to the FIFO sensord blocks indefinitely echo "" > $FIFO sleep 1 echo "" > $FIFO
fail texlive-collection-basic-2019-alt2_7.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/texmf-dist/scripts/shipunov/biokey2html.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/texmf-dist/scripts/shipunov/biokey2html.sh #!/bin/bash export PATH=.:{$PATH} biokey2html1.pl $1 > $12 biokey2html2.pl $12 > /tmp/$1.$$ biokey2html3.pl /tmp/$1.$$ > $1.html #
fail vlc-mini-3.0.11-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/vlc/utils/audio-vlc-default.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/vlc/utils/audio-vlc-default.sh MIME_FILE=~/.local/share/applications/defaults.list if [ ! -f $MIME_FILE ] then echo "[Default Applications]" > $MIME_FILE else grep -v 'audio/' $MIME_FILE > /tmp/vlc.defaults.list.tmp mv /tmp/vlc.defaults.list.tmp $MIME_FILE fi ls /usr/share/mime/audio/* | sed -e 's@/usr/share/mime/@@' -e 's/\.xml/=vlc.desktop/' >> $MIME_FILE Found error in /usr/share/vlc/utils/video-vlc-default.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/vlc/utils/video-vlc-default.sh MIME_FILE=~/.local/share/applications/defaults.list if [ ! -f $MIME_FILE ] then echo "[Default Applications]" > $MIME_FILE else grep -v 'video/' $MIME_FILE > /tmp/vlc.defaults.list.tmp mv /tmp/vlc.defaults.list.tmp $MIME_FILE fi ls /usr/share/mime/video/* | sed -e 's@/usr/share/mime/@@' -e 's/\.xml/=vlc.desktop/' >> $MIME_FILE
fail vzpbackup-1.6-alt1.git.5d1ff63f.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/bin/vzpbackup.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/bin/vzpbackup.sh # Check if the VE exists if grep -w "$CTID" <<< `$VZLIST_CMD -a -Hoctid` &> /dev/null; then if [ $COMPACT == 1 ]; then echo "Compacting CTID: $CTID" $VZCTL_CMD compact $CTID > /tmp/vzpbackup_compact_$CTID_$TIMESTAMP.log echo "Compact log file: /tmp/vzpbackup_compact_$CTID_$TIMESTAMP.log" fi echo "Backing up CTID: $CTID" ID=$(uuidgen)
fail xenomai-3.1-alt1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/lib64/xenomai/testsuite/dohell: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/lib64/xenomai/testsuite/dohell else echo netcat or nc not found exit 1 fi seq 1 399999 > /tmp/netcat.data ( while :; do cat /tmp/netcat.data; sleep 15; done | $nc $server $port ) & pids="$!" fi if [ -n "$mntpoint" ]; then while :; do dd if=/dev/zero of=$mntpoint/bigfile bs=1024000 count=100; sync; done &
info bash3-examples-3.2.57-alt4.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/scripts/bcsh.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/scripts/bcsh.sh ;; esac trap ':' 2 trap exit 3 trap "tail -n $savehist $histfile>/tmp/hist$$;uniq /tmp/hist$$ > $histfile;\ rm -f /tmp/*$$;exit 0" 15 getcmd=yes mailcheck= exclaim= echoit= -- while test "$line" != "end"; do echo $n "$PS2$c" read line cmd="${cmd};$line" done echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ed - /tmp/bcsh$$ << ++++ s/end/done/ s/foreach[ ]\(.*\)(/for \1 in / s/)// s/;/;do / w -- line=done ;; esac cmd="${cmd};$line" done echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; if[\ \ ]*) while test "$line" != "fi" && test "$line" != "endif" do echo $n "$PS2$c" -- line=fi ;; esac cmd="${cmd};$line" done echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ case "`grep then /tmp/bcsh$$`" in "") # fix 'if foo bar' cases ed - /tmp/bcsh$$ << ++++ s/)/);then/ s/.*/;fi/ w ++++ ;; -- echo $n "$PS2$c" read line cmd="${cmd}@$line" done cmd="`echo \"$cmd\" | tr '@' ' '`" echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; switch[\ \ ]*) while test "$line" != "endsw" do echo $n "$PS2$c" read line cmd="${cmd}@$line" done echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ed - /tmp/bcsh$$ << '++++' 1,$s/@/\ /g g/switch.*(/s//case "/ s/)/" in/ 1,$s/case[ ]\(.*\):$/;;\ -- g/breaksw/s/// 1,$s/default.*/;;\ *)/ w ++++ cmd="`cat /tmp/bcsh$$`" ;; *!*) hist=yes ;; esac -- echoit=yes getcmd=no continue ;; *~e) echo "$cmd" | sed -e "s@~e@@" > /tmp/bcsh$$ $EDITOR /tmp/bcsh$$ cmd="`cat /tmp/bcsh$$`" getcmd=no continue ;; *~v) echo "$cmd" | sed -e "s@~v@@" > /tmp/bcsh$$ echo "$lastcmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ $VISUAL /tmp/bcsh$$ cmd="`cat /tmp/bcsh$$`" getcmd=no continue ;; exec[\ \ ]*) tail -n $savehist $histfile>/tmp/hist$$ uniq /tmp/hist$$ > $histfile rm -f /tmp/*$$ echo $cmd > /tmp/cmd$$ . /tmp/cmd$$ ;; login[\ \ ]*|newgrp[\ \ ]*) tail -n $savehist $histfile>/tmp/hist$$ uniq /tmp/hist$$ > $histfile rm -f /tmp/*$$ echo $cmd > /tmp/cmd$$ . /tmp/cmd$$ ;; logout|exit|bye) if test -s "$logoutfile" then # sh $logoutfile $SHELL $logoutfile fi tail -n $savehist $histfile > /tmp/hist$$ uniq /tmp/hist$$ > $histfile rm -f /tmp/*$$ exit 0 ;; h|history) grep -n . $histfile | tail -n $history | sed -e 's@:@ @' | $PAGER continue -- continue ;; source[\ \ ]*) set - $cmd shift echo . $* > /tmp/cmd$$ . /tmp/cmd$$ run=no ;; wait) wait run=no ;; .[\ \ ]*) echo $cmd > /tmp/cmd$$ . /tmp/cmd$$ run=no ;; cd|cd[\ \ ]*) # check if it will work first, or else this shell will terminate # if the cd dies. If you have a built-in test, you might want # to replace the try-it-and-see below with a couple of tests, # but it is probably just as fast like this. echo $cmd > /tmp/cmd$$ if ($SHELL /tmp/cmd$$) ; then . /tmp/cmd$$ fi run=no ;; awk[\ \ ]*|dd[\ \ ]*|cc[\ \ ]*|make[\ \ ]*) # these are the only commands I can think of whose syntax # includes an equals sign. Add others as you find them. echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; setenv*|*=*) # handle setting shell variables, turning cshell syntax to Bourne # syntax -- note all variables must be exported or they will not # be usable in other commands echo "$cmd" > /tmp/cmd$$ ed - /tmp/cmd$$ << ++++ g/^setenv[ ]/s/[ ]/@/ g/^setenv@/s/[ ]/=/ g/^setenv@/s/// g/^set/s/// .t. \$s/=.*// s/^/export / w ++++ . /tmp/cmd$$ rm -f /tmp/cmd$$ run=no ;; unset[\ \ ]*|umask[\ \ ]*|export[\ \ ]*|set[\ \ ]*) # handle commands which twiddle current environment -- continue ;; esac ;; *) echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; esac ;; no) echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; esac ;; esac -- ;; *) case "$exclaim" in yes) cmd="`echo \"$cmd\" | sed -e 's@REALEXCLAMATIONMARK@!@g'`" echo "$cmd" > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; esac case "$echoit" in yes) echo $cmd -- yes) case "${noclobber+yes}" in yes) case "$cmd" in *\>![\ \ ]*) ed - /tmp/bcsh$$ << ++++ g/>!/s//>/ w ++++ ;; *\>\>*) -- read answer case "$answer" in y*) ;; *) echo ':' > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; esac ;; *) echo "${outfile}: file exists" echo ':' > /tmp/bcsh$$ ;; esac fi ;; esac -- esac ;; *) case "$cmd" in *\>![\ \ ]*) ed - /tmp/bcsh$$ << ++++ g/>!/s//>/g w ++++ ;; esac ;; esac (trap 'exit 1' 2 3; $BASH /tmp/bcsh$$) ;; esac case "$cmd" in $lastcmd) ;; Found error in /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/aliasconv.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/aliasconv.sh # usage: aliasconv.sh # # Chet Ramey # chet@po.cwru.edu # trap 'rm -f /tmp/cb$$.?' 0 1 2 3 6 15 T=' ' cat << \EOF >/tmp/cb$$.1 mkalias () { case $2 in '') echo alias ${1}="''" ;; *[#\!]*) -- # the first thing we want to do is to protect single quotes in the alias, # since they whole thing is going to be surrounded by single quotes when # passed to mkalias sed -e "s:':\\'\\\'\\':" -e "s/^\([a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\)$T\(.*\)$/mkalias \1 '\2'/" >>/tmp/cb$$.1 sh /tmp/cb$$.1 | sed -e 's/\$cwd/\$PWD/g' \ -e 's/\$term/\$TERM/g' \ -e 's/\$home/\$HOME/g' \ -e 's/\$user/\$USER/g' \ -e 's/\$prompt/\$PS1/g' Found error in /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/cshtobash: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/cshtobash # zsh-3.0. # # Chet Ramey # chet@po.cwru.edu # trap 'rm -f /tmp/cb$$.? cshout cshin' 0 1 2 3 6 15 T=$'\t' SOURCE="${1:+source $1}" cat << EOF >cshin $SOURCE alias >! /tmp/cb$$.a setenv >! /tmp/cb$$.e set >! /tmp/cb$$.v EOF # give csh a minimal environment, similar to what login would provide /usr/bin/env - USER=$USER HOME=$HOME PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/ucb:. TERM=$TERM SHELL=$SHELL /bin/csh -i < ./cshin > cshout 2>&1 # First convert aliases cat << \EOF >/tmp/cb$$.1 mkalias () { case $2 in '') echo alias ${1}="''" ;; *[#\!]*) -- *) echo alias ${1}=\'$(echo "${2}" | sed "s:':'\\\\'':")\' ;; esac } EOF sed "s/^\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)$T\(.*\)$/mkalias \1 '\2'/" < /tmp/cb$$.a >>/tmp/cb$$.1 echo '# csh aliases' echo $BASH /tmp/cb$$.1 | sed -e 's/\$cwd/\$PWD/g' \ -e 's/\$term/\$TERM/g' \ -e 's/\$home/\$HOME/g' \ -e 's/\$user/\$USER/g' \ -e 's/\$prompt/\$PS1/g' -- # Would be nice to deal with embedded newlines, e.g. in TERMCAP, but ... sed -e '/^SHLVL/d' \ -e '/^PWD/d' \ -e "s/'/'"\\\\"''"/g \ -e "s/^\([A-Za-z0-9_]*=\)/export \1'/" \ -e "s/$/'/" < /tmp/cb$$.e # Finally, convert local variables echo echo '# csh variables' echo -- sed -e 's/'"$T"'/=/' \ -e "s/'/'"\\\\"''"/g \ -e '/^[A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^(]/{ s/=/='"'/"' s/$/'"'/"' }' < /tmp/cb$$.v | sed -e '/^argv=/d' -e '/^cwd=/d' -e '/^filec=/d' -e '/^status=/d' \ -e '/^verbose=/d' \ -e '/^term=/d' \ -e '/^home=/d' \ -e '/^path=/d' \ -- # now some special csh variables converted to bash equivalents echo echo '# special csh variables converted to bash equivalents' echo sed -e 's/'"$T"'/=/' < /tmp/cb$$.v | grep "^cdpath=" | sed 's/(// s/ /:/g s/)// s/cdpath=/CDPATH=/' sed -e 's/'"$T"'/=/' < /tmp/cb$$.v | grep "^mail=" | sed 's/(// s/ /:/g s/)// s/mail=/MAILPATH=/' | Found error in /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/aliasconv.bash: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/bash3-3.2.57/examples/misc/aliasconv.bash # usage: aliasconv.bash # # Chet Ramey # chet@po.cwru.edu # trap 'rm -f /tmp/cb$$.?' 0 1 2 3 6 15 T=$'\t' cat << \EOF >/tmp/cb$$.1 mkalias () { case $2 in '') echo alias ${1}="''" ;; *[#\!]*) -- # the first thing we want to do is to protect single quotes in the alias, # since they whole thing is going to be surrounded by single quotes when # passed to mkalias sed -e "s:':\\'\\\'\\':" -e "s/^\([a-zA-Z0-9_-]*\)$T\(.*\)$/mkalias \1 '\2'/" >>/tmp/cb$$.1 $BASH /tmp/cb$$.1 | sed -e 's/\$cwd/\$PWD/g' \ -e 's/\$term/\$TERM/g' \ -e 's/\$home/\$HOME/g' \ -e 's/\$user/\$USER/g' \ -e 's/\$prompt/\$PS1/g'
info lbuscd-0.6-alt10.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /lib/udev/add_fstab_entry: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /lib/udev/add_fstab_entry LABEL=$(echo ${ID_BUS}${ID_TYPE}-$devicename |tr " " "_") fi fi # make sure the root we mount to exists ROOT=/tmp/drives [ -d $ROOT ] || mkdir ${ROOT} # invent $MOUNTPOINT MOUNTPOINT=$ROOT/$LABEL [ -d $MOUNTPOINT ] || mkdir ${MOUNTPOINT} -- if [ "${IOCHARSET}" = "utf8" ]; then MOUNTOPTS="${MOUNTOPTS},utf8" else MOUNTOPTS="${MOUNTOPTS},iocharset=${IOCHARSET}" fi echo "/dev/$devicename ${MOUNTPOINT} udf,iso9660,cdfs ${MOUNTOPTS} 0 0" >> /tmp/fstab echo "AddCdromDrive|${LABEL}|/dev/${devicename}|${DESCRIPTION}" > /tmp/lbus.fifo else REMOVABLE=0 MOUNTOPTS="rw,noatime" if [ ${BASEDEV} = "fd" ]; then DESCRIPTION="Floppy" -- fuse.ntfs|ntfs-3g) MOUNTOPTS="${MOUNTOPTS},silent,umask=000,locale=en_US.UTF-8" ;; esac fi echo "/dev/$devicename ${MOUNTPOINT} ${fstype} ${MOUNTOPTS} 0 0" >> /tmp/fstab echo "AddBlockDevice|${LABEL}|/dev/${devicename}|${REMOVABLE}|${SIZE}|${DESCRIPTION}" > /tmp/lbus.fifo fi Found error in /lib/udev/remove_fstab_entry: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /lib/udev/remove_fstab_entry # remove_fstab_entry # place in /lib/udev devicename=$1 grep '^/dev/'${devicename}'[[:blank:]]' /tmp/fstab | while read DEV MOUNTDIR TYPE OPTIONS DUMP PASS; do MOUNTPOINT=`basename "${MOUNTDIR}"` echo "RemoveDevice|${MOUNTPOINT}" > /tmp/lbus.fifo umount -l ${DEV} 2>&1 >/dev/null rmdir ${MOUNTDIR} done grep -v '^/dev/'$devicename'[[:blank:]]' /tmp/fstab >/tmp/fstab.tmp cp -f /tmp/fstab.tmp /tmp/fstab rm /tmp/fstab.tmp
info menu-2.1.41-alt22.qa1.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/menu-2.1.41/examples/cat: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/menu-2.1.41/examples/cat #!/bin/sh cat > /tmp/menu-stdin exit 0 #In the good old days of menu-0 compatibility, one had to use: -- # #This file can be very usefull when you want to run one particular # #menu-method file several times, without running any of the others. # #In order to do so, do: # # - cp ./cat /etc/menu-methods/ # # - run update-menus so that the "cat" menu-method gets executed. # # Now you've got /tmp/menu-stdin. # # - With this file, you don't need update-menus at all any more, and you # # can symply run your hand-written "menu-test" menu-method by typing: # # ./menu-test < /tmp/menu-stdin # # # # The advantage of doing this is # # - none of the other menu-method files get excecuted (speedup) # # - update-menus doesn't need to open some hundred menu-entry files # # every time you test a change in your menu-method file. # # (speedup) # compat="menu-1" # command="cat > /tmp/menu-stdin"
info python-module-pyinotify-examples-0.9.6-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/pyinotify/transient_file.sh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/pyinotify/transient_file.sh #!/bin/bash for a in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 do touch /tmp/test1234; echo -ne "42" > /tmp/test1234; rm -f /tmp/test1234; done
info python3-module-dialog-3.4.0-alt2.noarch The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/python3-module-dialog-3.4.0/examples/with-autowidgetsize/demo.py: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/python3-module-dialog-3.4.0/examples/with-autowidgetsize/demo.py easily append data. With the {widget} widget, you can see the data stream \ flow in real time. To create a FIFO, you can use the commmand mkfifo(1), like this: % mkfifo /tmp/my_shiny_new_fifo Then, you can cat(1) data to the FIFO like this: % cat >>/tmp/my_shiny_new_fifo First line of text Second line of text ... You can end the input to cat(1) by typing Ctrl-D at the beginning of a \ Found error in /usr/share/doc/python3-module-dialog-3.4.0/examples/demo.py: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/python3-module-dialog-3.4.0/examples/demo.py easily append data. With the {widget} widget, you can see the data stream \ flow in real time. To create a FIFO, you can use the commmand mkfifo(1), like this: % mkfifo /tmp/my_shiny_new_fifo Then, you can cat(1) data to the FIFO like this: % cat >>/tmp/my_shiny_new_fifo First line of text Second line of text ... You can end the input to cat(1) by typing Ctrl-D at the beginning of a \
info tcl-httpd-manual-3.5.1-alt1.qa2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/tcl-httpd-3.5.1/htdocs/cgi-bin/wiki.cgi: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/tcl-httpd-3.5.1/htdocs/cgi-bin/wiki.cgi cd ~welch/kit WIKIT_BASE=http://medlicott.panasas.com:8015/wiki export WIKIT_BASE echo $SCRIPT_NAME > /tmp/wiki.log echo HTTP/1.0 200 ok if [ ! -f /usr10/home/welch/kit/tclkit-linux-i686 ]; then echo "wiki.cgi not configured"
info zfs-utils-0.8.4-alt2.x86_64 The test discovered scripts with errors which may be used by a user for damaging important system files. For example if a script uses in its work a temp file which is created in /tmp directory, then every user can create symlinks with the same name (pattern) in this directory in order to destroy or rewrite some system or another user's files. Scripts _must_ _use_ mktemp/tempfile or must use $TMPDIR. mktemp/tempfile is safest. $TMPDIR is safer than /tmp/ because libpam-tmpdir creates a subdirectory of /tmp that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. Found error in /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/zpool_get_005_pos.ksh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/zpool_get_005_pos.ksh typeset -i i=0 while [[ $i -lt "${#properties[@]}" ]]; do log_note "Checking for parsable ${properties[$i]} property" log_must eval "zpool get -p ${properties[$i]} $TESTPOOL >/tmp/value.$$" grep "${properties[$i]}" /tmp/value.$$ >/dev/null 2>&1 if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then log_fail "${properties[$i]} not seen in output" fi typeset v=$(grep "${properties[$i]}" /tmp/value.$$ | awk '{print $3}') log_note "${properties[$i]} has a value of $v" # Determine if this value is a valid number, result in return code log_must test -n "$v" -- fi i=$(( $i + 1 )) done rm /tmp/value.$$ log_pass "Zpool get returns parsable values for all known parsable properties" Found error in /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/xattr_004_pos.ksh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/xattr_004_pos.ksh # we need to be able to create zvols to hold our test ufs|ext filesystem. verify_runnable "global" # Make sure we clean up properly function cleanup { if ismounted /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ $NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS; then log_must umount /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ log_must rm -rf /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ fi } log_assert "Files from $NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS,tmpfs with xattrs copied to zfs retain xattr info." log_onexit cleanup -- # Create a ufs|ext file system that we can work in log_must zfs create -V128m $TESTPOOL/$TESTFS/zvol block_device_wait log_must eval "echo y | newfs $ZVOL_DEVDIR/$TESTPOOL/$TESTFS/zvol > /dev/null 2>&1" log_must mkdir /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ if is_linux; then log_must mount -o user_xattr \ $ZVOL_DEVDIR/$TESTPOOL/$TESTFS/zvol /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ # Create files in ext and tmpfs, and set some xattrs on them. # Use small values for xattrs for ext compatibility. log_must touch /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ log_must touch /tmp/tmpfs-file.$$ echo "TEST XATTR" >/tmp/xattr1 echo "1234567890" >/tmp/xattr2 log_must attr -q -s xattr1 \ /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ /tmp/xattr1.$$" log_must diff /tmp/xattr1.$$ /tmp/xattr1 log_must eval "attr -q -g xattr2 $TESTDIR/tmpfs-file.$$ >/tmp/xattr2.$$" log_must diff /tmp/xattr2.$$ /tmp/xattr2 log_must rm /tmp/xattr1 /tmp/xattr1.$$ /tmp/xattr2 /tmp/xattr2.$$ log_must umount /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ else log_must mount $ZVOL_DEVDIR/$TESTPOOL/$TESTFS/zvol \ /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ # Create files in ufs and tmpfs, and set some xattrs on them. log_must touch /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ log_must touch /tmp/tmpfs-file.$$ log_must runat /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ \ cp /etc/passwd . log_must runat /tmp/tmpfs-file.$$ cp /etc/group . # copy those files to ZFS log_must cp -@ /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ \ $TESTDIR log_must cp -@ /tmp/tmpfs-file.$$ $TESTDIR # ensure the xattr information has been copied correctly log_must runat $TESTDIR/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS-file.$$ \ diff passwd /etc/passwd log_must runat $TESTDIR/tmpfs-file.$$ diff group /etc/group log_must umount /tmp/$NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS.$$ fi log_pass "Files from $NEWFS_DEFAULT_FS,tmpfs with xattrs copied to zfs retain xattr info." Found error in /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/xattr_003_neg.ksh: $ grep -A5 -B5 /tmp/ /usr/share/doc/zfs-utils-0.8.4/examples/xattr_003_neg.ksh create_xattr $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ passwd /etc/passwd log_must chmod 000 $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ if is_linux; then user_run $ZFS_USER eval \ "attr -q -g passwd $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ >/tmp/passwd.$$" log_mustnot diff /etc/passwd /tmp/passwd.$$ log_must rm /tmp/passwd.$$ user_run $ZFS_USER eval \ "attr -q -s passwd $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ /tmp/passwd.$$ log_must diff /etc/passwd /tmp/passwd.$$ log_must rm /tmp/passwd.$$ else log_mustnot su $ZFS_USER -c "runat $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ cat passwd" log_mustnot su $ZFS_USER -c "runat $TESTDIR/myfile.$$ cp /etc/passwd ." fi

generated by repocop at Sun Jul 5 04:25:11 2020